holding that because uninsured motorist carrier with notice of insured’s suit against uninsured tortfeasor may intervene in such litigation, carrier is bound by judgment against uninsured motorist, but ruling would apply only prospectively
How later courts described this case
- holding that because uninsured motorist carrier with notice of insured’s suit against uninsured tortfeasor may intervene in such litigation, carrier is bound by judgment against uninsured motorist, but ruling would apply only prospectively
- holding that where insurance carrier had adequate notice of suit between insured and uninsured motorist, it will be bound to the resulting judgment
- public policy mandated stacking of UM benefits where insured paid separate premiums for UM coverage on two vehicles covered by separate insurance policies
- “the consent to sue clause which attempts to place the requirement of the insurer’s permission as a condition precedent, conditions and limits the character of coverage mandated by the statute”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DAVISON, Justice
(dissenting in part):
I dissent to that portion of the majority opinion in that it allows stacking.
In the present case, plaintiff had uninsured motorist policy issued by defendant, MFA, on a certain Chevrolet automobile at the time he was injured by an uninsured motorist. Plaintiff also had another uninsured motorist policy also issued by the defendant, MFA, which covered a separate automobile. Two separate premiums were paid.
Both of these policies were issued in compliance with the statute, each policy had limits of liability of $10,000.00 for one person and $20,000.00 for two or more.
This dissent goes to the proposition as to whether the defendant may be held liable under the two policies issued to plaintiff, one policy having been issued to cover one automobile and the other policy covering a separate and different automobile.
Various jurisdictions have had different opinions on the question. Very few cases have involved the identical question and there appears to be no weight of authority to govern us.
A number of cases have held that the exceptions such as provided for in the policies in question are not available to the insurer when two or more policies are issued on the same automobile. However, in the present case, two distinct policy coverages exist, extending to two separate vehicles.
The precise question is one of first impression in this jurisdiction.
In the case of Castle v. United Pacific Insurance Group, 252 Or. 44 , 448 P.2d 357 , it was held that insured motorist under policy which provided distinct coverages, with separate premiums, for each of his two automobiles, was restricted to policy limit on uninsured motorist coverage applicable to automobile involved in accident, rather than to maximum recovery under coverage on each vehicle.
I am of the opinion that the case of M.F.A. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wallace, Ark., 431 S.W.2d 742 , after considering a statute very similar to ours, is well reasoned. As in the present case, in the cited case, the policy coverage on each automobile was not less than the limits provided by statute.
In the last cited case, it was reasoned:
“[I]t is obvious the statute is not designed to provide the insured with greater insurance than would have been available had the insured been injured by an operator of an automobile who had a policy containing the minimum statutory limits provided by [the act].”
I am of the opinion that liability coverage on each individual car meets the necessary requirement under our statute and that the liability of defendant is limited to *160 the coverage of the automobile involved in’ the accident.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice LAVENDER and Justice SIMMS concur in the views expressed herein.