holding that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply when the legislature amends a statutory term that the court has previously interpreted
How later courts described this case
- holding that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply when the legislature amends a statutory term that the court has previously interpreted
- “Interpretation of the meaning of a statute ends where the amendment or repeal of it begins.”
- “Of course, it is the duty of the court to invalidate a statute if it contravenes the constitution. .. . For the court to repeal a statute for no other reason than that it conflicts with the doctrine of stare decisis, is an obvious encroachment upon the legislative branch of the government.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Finley, J.
(dissenting) — I agree substantially with the well documented dissent of Foster, J., but wish to express my views on this matter, separately.
The majority change the public policy of this state regarding the so-called heart cases arising under the workmen’s compensation act. The change is an abrupt one. It is a reversal of a public policy which has stood for approximately twenty-five years (since the Metcalf case (1932), 168 Wash. 305 , 11 P. (2d) 821 ) without revision by the legislative branch of state government. The change is accomplished by judicial action in a field which, I think, is primarily the concern of the legislature. Furthermore, I believe that the legislature, through interim committee studies, public hearings, and otherwise, is much better equipped than the court to gather facts and statistics relative to the problem involved. It follows that the legislature should be in a better position to make a more scientific, or at least a more knowledgeable, decision or disposition of this problem of state public policy.
By way of justification of the end result reached, the majority opinion suggests (a) that the court erred approximately twenty-five years ago in the Metcalf case, supra, and improperly indulged in judicial legislation, substituting its judgment for that of the legislature; (b) that the court today perceives the true legislative purpose of the statute as *59 enacted by the legislative branch more than twenty-five years ago; (c) that the doctrine of stare decisis is inapplicable as to judicial decisions involving interpretation of statutes, and that the doctrine is in no way a restriction upon the majority in effecting a reversal of public policy in the instant case; (d) that it is the responsibility of the court, although somewhat belatedly, to effect the indicated change in public policy as to the heart cases.
If it can be said that the court in the Metcalf case indulged in judicial legislation, the action of the majority under the circumstances in the instant case clearly falls in the same category.
Employers and workmen under the act are the two groups directly concerned as to the public policy question involved. Each group has been effectively and intelligently represented in every session of the legislature for the last twenty-five years. Thus, the problem involved is not one that might go for many years without any attention from the legislature for lack of interest, activity, or legislative representation on the part of persons most concerned. For the above reason alone, it seems to me that the court should do nothing to change the existing state policy in the heart cases, and that, under the circumstances, any change should be left most appropriately to the legislature.
As is well known, the doctrine of stare decisis is not an absolute bar to judicial reconsideration of previously decided cases. However, if there ever was an instance where circumstances justified an application of the doctrine of stare decisis, the present case, at least in my best judgment, seems to be such an instance. The majority opinion suggests that the result might be different if the doctrine of stare decisis was applicable, but it states categorically that stare decisis is not applicable to cases involving the interpretation of statutes.
The only authority cited in support of this novel proposition is Petersen v. Department of Labor & Industries, 40 Wn. (2d) 635, 245 P. (2d) 1161 . The language of that decision does support the view of the majority. However, the *60 Petersen case cites no authority to support the thesis which limits the applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis. In fact, the Petersen case seems to stand in a field by itself; otherwise, the great and overwhelming weight of authority is to the contrary. The majority decide that the administration of the workmen’s compensation act as to the so-called “heart cases” is to be changed. To reach that result, it is unnecessary to discard the stability provided through the doctrine of stare decisis by stating it does not apply to judicial decisions involving the interpretation of statutes.
It seems to me that the real problem at hand is whether it is the responsibility of this court to effectuate a significant change in the public policy of this state as to the heart cases under the workmen’s compensation act. No facade of resounding legal rhetoric should obscure this fact- or the fact that the decision of the majority does make an abrupt change in the public policy of this state in the so-called heart cases.
I believe that the action of the majority in the instant case is untimely, undesirable, and unnecessary for the very practical reasons indicated hereinabove. It is my best judgment that discretion is the better part of valor, and that, in the instant case, the court should defer to the prerogatives and - the judgment of the legislature, as well as to the possibility of action by that branch of state government.
Rosellini, J., concurs with Finley, J.
Hunter, J., did not participate.
June 9, 1958. Petition for rehearing denied.