The opinion
BRETT, Judge
(special concurring opinion).
I concur in the opinion rendered herein by Judge Bussey. However, insofar as he did not specifically’ mention deíendánt’s complaint concerning the alleged violations of the district court rules, I think it should be said that this Court does not take judicial notice of the rules of the district court. Unless those rules are properly made a part of the appellate record, alleged violations of district court rules cannot constitute error on appeal. -Likewise,-when such rules have been made a part of the record and violations occur, proper objections should be made and .exceptions taken to properly preserve the record on appeal..
Also, it is better practice, when' objections are made “in chambers”, to make those same specific objections in open.court-in order to properly preservé the record.; As a general'rule,"what transpires in chambers is ;not necessarily- competent to the records When the. record reflects something -different- to -what -counsel contends occurred in;_ chambers, the .Court is bound ;to,-accept what-;is; pontained-in-the. record. . .
This record reflects that the trial judge conducted this trial with fairness, in an effort to scrupulously protect the defendant’s rights. It is observed also, that the Judge issued sufficient orders to prevent a situation from developing similar to that described by the United States Supreme Court in Sheppherd v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 , 86 S.Ct. 1506 , 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). At the same time, those rules appeared to allow the news media sufficient leeway to report the happenings during the trial. Reasonable reporting of trial proceedings by *614 the news media, is one of our principle safe- • guards against the recurrence of a “star-chamber proceeding”. But, such reporting must be made subject to reasonable rules of the trial court. As the United States Supreme Court repeated in Sheppherd, supra: . .
“The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and ■ criticism.”
• It should be pointed out, however, that the Supreme Court stated further, while referring ’to the trial court in Sheppherd v. Maxwell, supra:
“The court’s [trial court] fundamental error is compounded by the holding that it lacked power to control the publicity about the trial.”
We believe, however, that such power should be exercised with reason and good judgment. In the instant case, we have heard no particular complaints from the press concerning Judge Boston Smith’s rules governing news media coverage of this trial.
With reference to the pre-trial newspá-per statements made by the prosecution, there is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that they were improper. The trial of a criminal case should take place in the courtroom. The evidence should not be aired in the newspapers before the trial occurs.
In the instant case the evidence was sufficient; it was corroborated; and it remained unrefuted by the defendant. Con- '■ sequently, such pre-trial, statements appear-not to have sufficiently prejudiced this defendant to cause reversible error. How-. ever, in a case wherein it is apparent that' such publicity might have influenced the jury, or wherein the evidence was less sufficient than it was in the" case at bar, such pre-trial newspaper státements may well constitute reversible error.
With further reference to the publicity mentioned above, we believe the jury was not unduly influenced thereby. In the closing arguments, the State asked the jury to impose the maximum punishment on this defendant. The jury was asked to sentence the defendant to fifteen years confinement in the state penitentiary. But instead, the jury imposed a five-year sentence upon this defendant. This fact, considered with the unrefuted evidence, contained in the record, leads the Court to conclude that the jury was not influenced by such pre-trial publicity.
Likewise, I agree completely with what Judge Nix has stated in his concurring opinion, concerning the preliminary hearing. For that reason, there is no need for me to attempt to enlarge on those comments.
After considering the voluminous record in this case, consisting of the case-made of five volumes, all the transcripts of separate hearings, numerous pleadings filed, the exhibits and briefs filed by both sides, we must conclude that this defendant received a fair trial, in accordance with due process.