discussing “the requirements of legal and constitutional classification, i.e., equal 17 protection of the law[,]” explaining that in order to be legal, a classification “must be 18 founded upon real differences of situation or condition, which bear a just and proper 19 relation to the attempted classification, and reasonably justify a different rule[,]” and 8 1 concluding that “[i]f persons under the same circumstances and conditions are treated 2 differently, there is arbitrary discrimination, and not classification”
How later courts described this case
- discussing “the requirements of legal and constitutional classification, i.e., equal 17 protection of the law[,]” explaining that in order to be legal, a classification “must be 18 founded upon real differences of situation or condition, which bear a just and proper 19 relation to the attempted classification, and reasonably justify a different rule[,]” and 8 1 concluding that “[i]f persons under the same circumstances and conditions are treated 2 differently, there is arbitrary discrimination, and not classification”
- discussing “the requirements of legal and constitutional classification, i.e., equal protection of the law[,]” explaining that in order to be legal, a classification “must be founded upon real differences of situation or condition, which bear a just and proper relation to the attempted classification, and reasonably justify a different rule[,]” and concluding that “[i]f persons under the same circumstances and conditions are treated differently, there is arbitrary discrimination, and not classification”
- noting that the parties stipulated that “the term ‘flat rate schedule’ used in the Act has a meaning in the automobile repair field. That is the only technical meaning known. It is not known whether this is the only field where a flat rate schedule is used.”
- striking down a wage classification as “arbitrary and oppressive and without any valid reason” when the class included food or drink servers as well all types of drug store employees, not just those drug store employees serving food or drink
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SADLER, J., dissents.
.SADLER, Justice (dissenting).
The critical language in the statute assailed is found in L.1955, c. 200, § 2(c) (1), 1953 Comp., § 59-3-21 (c) (1), 1955 Supplement, reading as follows:
“(c) ‘Service employees’ shall be interpreted to mean persons employed in the following establishments and occupations :
“(1) restaurants, cafes, drug stores, and other establishments furnishing food or drink for consumption on the premises.”
If the construction given this language by the majority be correct, then it was the legislative intent that employees in the establishments mentioned, other than those engaged in serving, i. e. “furnishing food or drink for consumption on the premises,” as well as those so engaged, are governed 'by the minimum wage of 50 cents per hour. In other words, the pharmacist in the “drug store,” or the dietician, or bookkeeper in the cafe or restaurant, or the manager of the cafe or drug store, each and all are proper subjects for an application of the lowest bracket of the minimum wage, imposed by the law.
' A construction so shocking, so inequitable and so unfair, naturally, causes one to come to an abrupt halt in a consideration of the matter and inquire: Could the legislature, actually, have intended so absurd a result? Only when no other fair and reasonable meaning may be deduced from the language employed, should we adopt an interpretation that tends to convict the legislature of stupidity. Indeed, it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that we should not strike down a legislative enactment until we have exhausted every reasonable intendment in favor of its legality. State v. Saiz, 62 N. M. -, 308 P.2d 205 . The majority have failed to apply this cardinal rule here.
A consideration of the language employed cannot fail to satisfy one that the legislature only intended it to apply to bar maids, waitresses, soda jerkers, tray boys and others immediately engaged in serving food and drink consumed on the premises —not to the pharmacist in a drug store, or the bookkeeper or accountant in a cafe or restaurant. The use of the word “occupation” in the language quoted supports such a construction.
It does not aid the majority position to say the legislature can easily clarify the law by amending. They have already made it clear according to a reasonable construction of the questioned language. The majority ruling otherwise,
I dissent.
Order Denying Motion for Rehearing.
PER CURIAM. This cause coming on for consideration on motion for rehearing filed by the plaintiff (appellee) complaining of the opinion filed in so far as it holds unconstitutional a portion of L.195S, c. 200, and the Court having read and considered said motion and the briefs of the parties touching same, and being well and sufficiently advised in the premises;
It Is Ordered by the Court, Chief Justice LUJAN, Mr. Justice COMPTON and Mr. Justice KIKER assenting; Mr. Justice SADLER and Mr. Justice McGHEE, dissenting, that the motion for rehearing be and the same is hereby denied. Mr. Justice McGHEE having announced that further consideration has satisfied him the questioned act is not subject to the objections made against it, wishes to withdraw his concurrence in the majority opinion, as heretofore indicated, and announces concurrence in the dissenting opinion filed by Mr. Justice SADLER.