The opinion
MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in parts B and C of the majority opinion: the reporter’s constitutional immunity prevails over any asserted interest of civil litigants in compelling discovery, and the immunity does not apply to sanctions other than contempt. I dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion in part A that the reporter may not seek to adjudicate, by writ review, the applicability of the constitutional immunity before being held in contempt. 1
*465 Instead, I would hold that there is an exception to this generally sound rule when, as here, (1) threat of contempt is imminent; (2) there are strong policy interests in early adjudication—in this case, fulfilling the basic purpose of the shield immunity to free reporters from having to choose between surrendering protected sources or being held in contempt; and (3) all the issues necessary for an appellate court to adjudicate the writ petition have already been litigated in a lower court. I emphasize that such an exception does not call for a change in California’s writ system; rather, the exception is tailored to suit the unique timing problems raised by a constitutional immunity from contempt.
I. The Fact That the Shield Law Provides Immunity From Contempt Does Not Resolve the Prematurity Issue
The majority take the position that the very fact the shield law provides immunity from contempt rather than a privilege disposes of the question of when the issue should be adjudicated: “Because the shield law provides only an immunity from contempt, there is nothing from which to seek relief until a newsperson has been adjudged in contempt.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 459, italics in original.)
This reasoning, however, takes a somewhat metaphysical view of the issue of prematurity of adjudication. The fact that the shield is an immunity from contempt rather than a privilege governs only the kind of relief that can be granted, not the timing of that relief. As will appear, the timing of the adjudication is instead dictated by various jurisprudential and policy concerns that are similar to those underlying the doctrine of ripeness in the federal jurisdictional context.
A. The Beneficial Interest of the Petitioner
A party seeking writ relief must have a “beneficial interest” in the outcome of the proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1086, 1103.) The question whether a petitioner has a beneficial interest in the proceeding generally *466 concerns the question of standing: i.e., whether the petitioner has incurred an injury capable of redress. The requirement of beneficial interest will be relaxed, or broadly interpreted, when the petition seeks to vindicate a strong public interest or to enforce public rights. (Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 144 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 624 P.2d 256 ] [welfare recipients have standing to challenge overly restrictive welfare regulations not directly imposed on them]; Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 263, 272 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 529 P.2d 1017 ] [citizens have standing to sue to compel environmental impact study of annexation of nearby land].)
The doctrine of ripeness is logically related to the concept of standing and therefore to the concept of beneficial interest. Standing, ripeness, and the related doctrine of mootness all enforce the principle that courts will intervene in disputes over government action only “at the instance of one who is himself immediately harmed, or immediately threatened with harm, by the challenged action.” (Poe v. Ullman (1961) 367 U.S. 497, 504 [ 6 L.Ed.2d 989, 996 , 81 S.Ct. 1752 ] (plur. opn. of Frankfurter, J.).) Although considerations of ripeness generally preclude the redress of legal injuries before they have occurred, exceptions to this rule have evolved. Our notion of what constitutes a beneficial interest necessary to obtain writ review should reflect this evolution of the ripeness doctrine.
B. The Doctrine of Ripeness and Challenges to Statutes Prior to Criminal Prosecution
A useful analogy to the present case is a challenge to a criminal statute prior to prosecution. Although traditional notions of ripeness generally prevent such a challenge, there are exceptions: “it is not necessary that [the accused] first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters with the exercise of his constitutional rights.” (Steffel v. Thompson (1974) 415 U.S. 452, 459 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 505, 514 , 94 S.Ct. 1209 ].) “When the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he ‘should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.’ ” (Babbitt v. Farm Workers (1979) 442 U.S. 289, 298 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 895, 906 , 99 S.Ct. 2301 ].)
In Steffel v. Thompson, supra, 415 U.S. 452 , the petitioner, who had distributed handbills against the Vietnam war outside a shopping center, sought declaratory relief from prosecution under a Georgia criminal trespass statute. In determining that the petitioner’s claim was ripe for adjudication, the Supreme Court stressed that the threat of prosecution was not *467 speculative but that the petitioner had been warned on two previous occasions to cease distribution of the handbills or face prosecution.
In Babbitt v. Farm Workers, supra, 442 U.S. 289 , the court held that provisions of an Arizona statute regulating union elections and prohibiting various forms of union-run consumer publicity campaigns presented an actual controversy, ripe for adjudication, despite the fact that plaintiff United Farm Workers (UFW) had not yet invoked the election procedures or conducted a consumer publicity campaign in the state. The UFW claimed these provisions violated its First Amendment free speech and associational rights. The Supreme Court observed that the UFW had an extensive record of running union elections and consumer publicity campaigns in California, and had the manifest intention of doing the same in Arizona. The court concluded that the UFW’s curtailment of its First Amendment activities to avoid criminal prosecution, and to avoid participation in unrepresentative elections, rendered its challenge to the statute adjudicable. (Id. at pp. 297-305 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 905-911].) The court also rejected the view that adjudication of the election provisions “be postponed until ‘a better factual record might be available’ ” (id. at p. 300 [ 60 L.Ed.2d at p. 907 ]); it concluded that no further information was needed to determine “the threshold question whether the election procedures are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment at all.” (Id. at p. 301 [ 60 L.Ed.2d at p. 908 ].)
A three-pronged test emerges from these cases to determine when a statute can be challenged prior to prosecution: (1) an important constitutional right is at stake that would benefit from early adjudication; (2) a prosecution or other sanction is “certainly impending” (Babbitt v. Farm Workers, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 298 [ 60 L.Ed.2d at p. 906 ]); and (3) at the point at which the adjudication occurs, there is either a sufficient record of how the challenged law would apply to the plaintiff, or a colorable claim that the law is substantially overbroad and therefore invalid on its face.
C. Application to the Present Case
The challenge by writ of an impending contempt order presents a close analogy to the challenge of a statute prior to prosecution. As will be demonstrated, precontempt adjudication and writ review of the reporter’s immunity meet all three prongs of the early-adjudication test articulated above.
First, the vindication of an important state constitutional right is at stake here, and that right would clearly benefit from early adjudication. The basic purpose of the constitutional shield law is to prevent reporters from being held in contempt and going to jail for protecting unpublished information and confidential sources. (See Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends, to Cal. *468 Const, with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (June 3, 1980), argument in favor of Prop. 5, p. 19.) Precontempt adjudication of these claims—preventing reporters who justly invoke the privilege from serving any jail time— accomplishes this protective purpose and encourages the more vigorous exercise of the reporter’s right.
We have recognized the desirability of early adjudication and writ review when a court compels disclosure of information that would jeopardize a privileged relationship. (Roberts v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330, 336 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 309 , 508 P.2d 309 ] [precontempt writ review permitted to protect psychotherapist-patient privilege from improper discovery].) As we there explained, to refuse precontempt review would confront the holder of the privilege with unacceptable alternatives: “The person seeking to exercise the privilege must either succumb to the court’s order and disclose the privileged information, or subject himself to a charge of contempt for his refusal to obey the court’s order pending appeal. The first of these alternatives is hardly an adequate remedy and could lead to disruption of a confidential relationship. The second is clearly inadequate as it would involve the possibility of a jail sentence and additional delay in the principal litigation during review of the contempt order.” (Ibid.) From a policy standpoint, that reasoning applies equally well to the exercise of the reporter’s constitutional immunity to protect sources and unpublished information.
Second, there is in this case an injury—being held in contempt—that is “certainly impending.” Once a motion to compel production of the reporter’s documents has been granted or the reporter’s motion to quash a subpoena has been denied, the threat to the reporter of being held in contempt moves from a mere possibility to an imminent reality. As in the federal cases cited above, the party seeking relief is on an inevitable collision course with the authority empowered to impose legal sanctions—here, the trial judge.
As to the third prong of the test, the majority assert that “Premature interference in trial court proceedings would deprive reviewing courts of adequate factual records for making [a] determination [of the applicability of the shield law].” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 459.) The basis for this statement is unclear. In most cases, all the issues related to the applicability of the shield law are litigated during the hearing on the various motions—to compel production, to quash the subpoena, etc. Indeed, this is how the majority were able to determine that the shield law applied in the present case, in spite of the fact that no contempt order had been issued when writ review was sought. If for some reason the factual record is insufficient, an appellate court could deny the writ petition on that basis in that particular case. Were *469 we to adopt the rule of precontempt writ review in reporter’s shield cases, it is a virtual certainty that the material issues would be thoroughly litigated at the motion stage.
II. Policy Considerations
The majority advance two policy considerations to bolster their argument that precontempt writ relief is premature. One, the incompleteness of the factual record, has just been discussed. The second, already partially discussed, merits additional comment.
The majority assert that “Premature relief would also allow newspersons to avoid the responsibility of choosing between disclosing information and being held in contempt. A newsperson would have no incentive to make that choice until after a decision by a reviewing court. The result would be an increased burden on reviewing courts.” (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 459-460.)
This is a perplexing rationale. As noted above, the main purpose of the shield law is to free reporters from having to choose between protecting their unpublished information or being held in contempt. It is curious to argue that compelling this same choice is now the virtue of denying writ relief. The only way in which the majority’s rule could reduce the appellate court docket one iota is by making it more burdensome for reporters to raise shield law claims. Not only would such a decrease in workload be minuscule at best, but it would be accomplished at the expense of vitiating the very purpose of the shield law.
III. Qualified First Amendment Privileges
Finally, a reporter’s claim to protect unpublished information and confidential sources may be based both on the shield law and on a qualified First Amendment privilege. (Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 268, 279 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 690 P.2d 625 ].) Thus, if the “privilege/ immunity” distinction is held to be decisive in determining whether precontempt writ relief is granted, the reporter who seeks the protection of both the shield immunity and the First Amendment privilege will be able to seek precontempt writ relief on the privilege claim and, if that relief is denied, return with a postcontempt writ petition based on his constitutional immunity.
To avoid squandering judicial resources in needless bifurcation of writ proceedings, we should therefore permit precontempt writ review in determining the applicability of the reporter’s shield provision.
*470
Conclusion
The fact that the reporter’s shield provision of the California Constitution is in the form of an immunity from contempt rather than a privilege does not ipso facto determine at what time the applicability of the shield law should be adjudicated. The ripeness of the adjudication is instead governed by various policy and jurisprudential considerations; in my view these considerations dictate that we should permit writ review prior to a contempt proceeding, once it is clear that contempt is imminent. The reporter should not be required to await writ review until he has suffered the humiliation of being held in contempt by a judge and a bailiff has placed him in handcuffs and led him off to jail.
The majority recommend that the trial court stay its contempt order pending pursuit of the reporter’s postcontempt writ petition, and that if the lower court does not do so the *465 appellate court should. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 460.) These recommendations mitigate the consequences flowing from the majority’s position, but make the position no less erroneous.
Moreover, the precontempt writ review I propose would go further in protecting the reporter’s rights under the shield law. Early adjudication of immunity claims would lead to expedited clarification of the reporter’s rights and liabilities in the given situation, and accordingly decrease the risk of exercising those rights. It would also assure more effectively than the majority’s recommendations that the reporter will spend no time in jail for good faith exercise of his rights under the shield law, especially in close cases when the trial court may be disinclined to grant a stay and the appellate court’s issuance of a stay is less than prompt. Finally, it would spare those who justly exercise their rights from bearing the onus of being held in contempt.