explaining that where the misconduct is the supposed interjection of extrinsic evidence, the test is whether the alleged information actually constituted misconduct, and if so, whether it affected the verdict
How later courts described this case
- explaining that where the misconduct is the supposed interjection of extrinsic evidence, the test is whether the alleged information actually constituted misconduct, and if so, whether it affected the verdict
- explaining that reasonably prudent medical care is not within a lay person’s knowledge so the standard of care “must be determined by reference to expert testimony as to what is reasonably prudent”
- explaining that medical care is “not within the knowledge of lay persons,” so the standard of care “must be determined by reference to expert testimony as to what is reasonably prudent”
- finding no misconduct when jurors applied specialized medical knowledge during deliberations because that information was disclosed during voir dire
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*279 Coleman, C.J. (dissenting)
The majority acknowledges that Geisler's comments were the sort that usually would not be allowed to be introduced into deliberations. The majority's position, however, is that in leaving Geisler on the jury, the Richards accepted the risk that she would make such comments. I agree that because Geisler fully disclosed her background on voir dire, the Richards accepted the risks that her background might influence the manner in which she weighed the evidence and that others, knowing her background, might be influenced by her. However, in leaving Geisler on the jury, the Richards did not accept the risk that she would go beyond the facts and evidence of the case.
I believe that the majority has mischaracterized the alleged extrinsic evidence. The extrinsic evidence is not that Geisler reviewed Mrs. Richard's medical records and then stated that in her opinion, the flu, rather than negligence of the doctors, explained the defects of the child. Rather, the extrinsic evidence was that Geisler cited examples from her own experience to buttress her position and influence the others.
For example, when asked how it could be that a child could be sent home as normal and later turn out not to be normal, Geisler told the others that in her experience, that happens all the time. She said she knew of other children who were born with deficits that had not shown up right away. Geisler also said that it was common practice for doctors to record the previous diagnosis when making an entry in medical records, rather than to make an independent diagnosis. She said that based upon her experience working with retarded children, she knew that viral illness could cause brain damage and other birth defects. Even if the chance that all of Michelle's defects were caused before birth was one in 400 million, Geisler said that in her experience, it happens. Finally, she said that based upon her experience with children who had the same things wrong with them as Michelle had, she was convinced that Michelle was born with her defects.
*280 An analogous situation would be if a lawyer were allowed to remain on a jury. A lawyer's experiences and legal training are bound to affect the way he or she evaluates the evidence of a case. Clearly, however, it would be prejudicial misconduct for a lawyer to emphasize his or her professional expertise and then to cite specific examples in an effort to influence other jurors.
Ordinarily, if jurors talk about their experiences, other jurors can balance that information against their own life experiences. What distinguishes Geisler’s comments is that they reflect that she brought into the deliberations highly specialized information like that to which various experts testified at trial. See State v. Briggs, 55 Wn. App. 44, 58 , 776 P.2d 1347 (1989); see also United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir. 1975). Because her experience was outside that of an ordinary juror, the others could not refute her statements. As such, her comments added credibility to the experts who testified on behalf of the defendants. See Briggs, at 56 (juror's comments rebutted the credibility of witnesses at trial). Because the jury's resolution of the dispute turned upon the credibility of each side’s experts, the comments were prejudicial. See Briggs, at 56-57.
Respectfully, therefore, I dissent. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for a new trial.
Review denied at 116 Wn.2d 1014 (1991).