holding witness who has been hypnotized may testify only to facts demonstrably recalled prior to hypnosis and only where certain prerequisites have been met
How later courts described this case
- holding witness who has been hypnotized may testify only to facts demonstrably recalled prior to hypnosis and only where certain prerequisites have been met
- Once Frye is satisfied, scientific evidence is admissible “subject to a foundational showing that the expert was qualified, the technique was properly used, and the results were accurately recorded.”
- witness may testify with regard to those matters he was able to "recall and relate" prior to hypnosis, as long as the hypnotic procedure itself is designed to minimize the danger of contamination
- testimony on prehypnotic recollections admissible provided that the extent of such recollections is recorded prior to hypnosis
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HOLOHAN, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
There has been some small progress in undoing the unfortunate rule fashioned by State v. Mena, supra. I concur with that portion of the lead opinion which permits a witness to testify about matters recalled prior to being hypnotized. I dissent from the remainder of the opinion.
In my judgment the so-called Frye test has been misapplied in this case. As pointed out in my earlier dissent, it is not the answers given under hypnosis which are being offered. The results of the hypnotic session are not being offered as scientific evidence of a fact. The witness, himself, is being offered with the hypnotic session as just one of the many factors which affect a witness. The effects of hypnosis have been studied by the scientific community and conclusions reached. We are aware from these studies of the dangers in the process. The fact of hypnosis, in my view, should be a matter of weight with the trier of fact but not a disqualification. The recent decision by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Chapman v. State, supra, supports this conclusion.
Mr. Justice Hays takes a different approach to the admission of post-hypnotic testimony in that he would require the safeguards adopted in State v. Hurd, supra, and corroboration by other independent evidence. I believe this position is overly restrictive and unnecessary to assure reliability. It would appear to me that if the testimony of a witness was corroborated by independent evidence, that should be sufficient assurance of reliability without the necessity of additional safeguards.
The standards adopted in State v. Hurd, supra, are certainly reasonable and carefully drawn, and the adoption of such standards would appear far better than our present rule.