predicting the emergence of a rule that “a person has not been significantly deprived of freedom of action for Miranda purposes as long as he is in his own car, even if it is surrounded by several patrol cars and officers with drawn weapons”
How later courts described this case
- predicting the emergence of a rule that “a person has not been significantly deprived of freedom of action for Miranda purposes as long as he is in his own car, even if it is surrounded by several patrol cars and officers with drawn weapons”
- petitioner's contribution to the maintenance of the household, including taking care of respondent's two children along with her own daughter, supported inference that the parties intended that their property was owned jointly
- where text of notice of appeal stated that appeal was taken from "judgment," but copy of nonappealable order was attached to notice, notice was nevertheless jurisdictionally sufficient
- special chair recommended by employee's physician held not to come within the meaning of "medical service"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBERTS, J.,
concurring.
I voted with the majority in this case because I believe requiring the police to be sensitive to the impact of an interrogation upon a defendant is, in the long run, more protective of a defendant’s constitutional rights and more consistent with the kind of safeguards Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 , 86 S Ct 1602 , 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966) meant to provide than is requiring a police officer to give a defendant the warnings required by Miranda at the point at which the officer has made a decision to arrest.
Were our opinion here only deciding this case and nothing more, I would have voted with the dissent by *76 Justice Lent. My concern with the position of that dissent applied generally, however, is that making a police officer’s decision to arrest the trigger point for issuance of Miranda warnings points the way to the possibility of police abuse, and leaves the investigatory procedure too susceptible to police manipulation. Only the officer knows at what point he or she makes a decision to arrest. By requiring that something other than the officer’s state of mind be considered in determining whether or not a defendant is “deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,” Miranda, 384 US at 444, 477 , 86 S Ct at 1612, 1629 , 16 L Ed 2d at 706, 725 , the officer has to make a determination of whether or not that individual would feel a significant, coercive deprivation of his or her freedom of action. It is my belief that this inquiry ultimately provides the standard of protection enunciated in Miranda and with which we struggle here.