Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board

BIRD, C. J.,

Concurring and Dissenting. — Although I join in the majority’s conclusion that the Department of Industrial Relations is not entitled to receive from the employer the difference between the amount due a partial dependent and the maximum statutory payment, I must dissent from the formula used by the majority to calculate the benefit due a partial dependent.

The majority adopt a formula which requires a case-by-case determination of the actual amount the deceased spouse devoted to the support of the community and the surviving spouse. (Maj. opn. at pp. 722-723.) By contrast, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) favored a general rule providing that, except in unusual situations, the total earnings of the deceased spouse be used as the measure of the surviving spouse’s dependency. (Oropeza v. Newman Seed Company (1980) 45 Cal. Comp. Cases 1148 .)

Ordinarily, this court would defer to the interpretation of a statute adopted by the agency charged with its enforcement. (Jones v. Tracy School Dist. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 99, 107 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 100 , 611 P.2d 441 ] and cases cited.) I see nb reason why we should deviate from that rule in this case. The Board adopted a reasonable interpretation of the statute, and I would adopt its formulation.

Former Labor Code section 4702 provided that the death benefit for partial dependents should be “four times the amount annually devoted to the support of the dependents by the employee,” up to a maximum of $50,000. (Italics added.) Nothing in this language required the Board to individually determine the percentage of a deceased employee’s income used to support the surviving spouse. As the Board noted in Oropeza , California’s community property laws render it difficult to distinguish between the support of one spouse and the support of the community. (Oropeza, supra, 45 Cal.Comp.Cases at pp. 1152-1153.) “The marital community is something more than the sum of the economic interests of individuals who make it up. It is this community *730 which is shattered by a fatal industrial injury. The community, not merely the surviving spouse, loses the benefit of the deceased spouse’s earnings.” (Id., at p. 1153.)

Further, the formula adopted by the majority would result in the anomalous situation of a completely dependent spouse receiving the statutory maximum, while a surviving spouse who earned only a small amount would receive only the amount she could prove had been devoted to her support. As stated in Oropeza , “absent specific direction from the Legislature, the Board [should] not presume that the Legislature intended the harsh results which would flow from applying this formula to the logical extremes urged by petitioner.” (Id., at p. 1152.)

Finally, due deference should be given to an administrate agency’s clear preference for a general rule, rather than individual determinations of dependency. The Board has utilized a general rule in the past and favors it now. The case-by-case analysis mandated by the majority will accomplish two things — it will result in harsh and unfair judgments and it will undoubtedly increase the agency’s workload. The agency will be required to make difficult and unnecessary decisions about the nature of dependency in every case that comes before it. What expenses are to be considered to be those devoted to the support of dependents? Who is to have the burden of proof? What type of proof will be accepted? These are but a few of the questions that must be addressed in each case.

Rather than require the administrative agency to grapple with these complex issues, I would follow precedent and defer to the Board’s reasonable interpretation of the Legislature’s intent.

The petition of respondent Department of Industrial Relations for a rehearing was denied June 23, 1982, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.