Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville

KAUGER, Justice,

concurring in parts I, V; concurring in result in parts II, IV, VI, concurring in part, dissenting in part in parts III, and VII.

There are three reasons why the jury verdict should be affirmed: 1) Because it *787 appears that there were material questions of fact, and it does not appear beyond doubt that the parishioner could have proven pre-withdrawal acts entitling her to relief, entry of summary judgment would have been premature; 2) The Okla. Const., art. 1, § 2 provides bona fide, separate, adequate and independent grounds which support the jury verdict; and 3) Based on the stipulation of the parties, the instructions to the jury, and the jury verdict, the verdict on appeal involves only post-withdrawal acts.

I

The opinion states “that the parishioner has not had an opportunity to present specific evidence concerning whether the Elders’ pre-withdrawal acts were a threat to the public safety, peace or order.” Nevertheless, the majority is “convinced that affording the parishioner an opportunity to do so would be a meaningless gesture.” In effect, the opinion holds that the trial court erred when it refused to enter summary judgment in favor of the Elders on this issue. It concludes that “the law presumes that during the time the parishioner was a member of the church she voluntarily submitted herself to all known tenets of congregational discipline.” The opinion impliedly determines that the presumption is irrebuttable. Nevertheless, the presumption that the appellee submitted to all doctrinal teaching is inconclusive from the facts as presented in the opinion. It is unrefuted that the appellee “was not taught the Church’s prohibition against withdrawal of membership.”

The freedom to act upon religious beliefs — to engage in religious activity — is not absolute as is the right to hold those beliefs. Activity may be curtailed in some circumstances for the protection of sufficiently compelling societal interest. 1 In Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 , 60 S.Ct. 900, 903 , 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1218 (1940), the United States Supreme Court said:

“The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts, — freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society ...”

In Buckner v. General Motors Corp. 760 P.2d 803, 812 (Okla.1988), the Court held:

“Even when the basic facts are undisputed, motions for summary judgment should be denied, if under the evidence, reasonable persons might reach different inferences or conclusions from the undisputed facts. Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, affidavits, deposition, admissions or other evidentia-ry materials establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In appraising the sufficiency of a petition, the accepted rule is that a petition should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle her to relief.”

Premature entry of summary judgment would have been improper. Fundamental fairness in the litigation process cannot be afforded except within the framework of orderly procedure. 2

*788 II

The opinion bases its reasoning and its analysis on the first amendment to the United States Constitution and its progeny in finding that the elders’ pre-withdrawal acts must threaten the public safety, peace or order. The federal constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof_” 3 Although the Oklahoma Constitution parrots the United States Constitution in many instances, its provision for religious liberty does not. The Okla.Const., art. 1, § 2, provides that 11 ■perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured, and no inhabitant of the State shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship ...” 4

States, in the exercise of their sovereign power, may afford more expansive individual rights and liberties than those conferred by the United States Constitution. 5 State statutes or state constitutions which afford greater individual rights or liberties than the federal constitution must be determined by following state law. It is only when state law provides less protection that the question must be determined by federal law. The people of this state are governed by the Oklahoma Constitution, and when it grants a right or provides a principle of law or procedure beyond the protections supplied by the federal constitution, it is the final authority. 6 This is so *789 even if the state constitutional provision is ■similar to the federal constitution. The United States Constitution provides a floor of constitutional rights — state constitutions provide the ceiling. 7 The minimal national standard established by the United States Supreme Court cannot be considered dis-positive in determining the scope of Oklahoma’s art. 1, § 2, constitutional guarantees. 8 Here, the Oklahoma Constitution provide bona fide, separate, adequate, and independent grounds upon which the jury verdict should be affirmed. 9

Ill

The cause was submitted to the jury on three separate verdicts on each of the three theories asserted. However, the parties stipulated that the parishoners could recover only the highest amount awarded for any theory. This stipulation was included in the jury instructions. 10 The largest amount was a verdict for publication of private facts. It is undisputed that the publication involved post-withdrawal actions by the elders. The verdict is consistent with the findings and stipulations. 11

Whether the acts of the elders threatened the public safety, peace or order, or whether the appellee was “molested in person or property on account of her religious worship” are questions of fact for the jury. Although I would affirm the jury verdict, if the cause is to be remanded, the Oklahoma Constitution requires that both the pre-withdrawal and post-withdrawal acts of the Elders be presented to the jury.

. Forest Hills Early Learning Center, Inc. v. Lukhard, 728 F.2d 230, 240 (4th Cir.1984).

. Pryse Monument Co. v. District Court, 595 P.2d 435, 438 (Okla.1979). LaBarge v. Zebco, et al., 769 P.2d 125 (Okla.1988), (Opala, J. dissenting).

. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

. The Okla. Const., art. I, § 2, states:

"Perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured, and no inhabitant of the State shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship; and no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited.”

The state of Pennsylvania is another example of state constitutions providing more explicit guarantees of individual rights:

“All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship.” Pa. Const., art. I, § 3.

. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 , 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040 , 64 L.Ed.2d 741, 752 (1980) (involved the right of free expression under the first amendment and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances); Turner v. City of Lawton, 733 P.2d 375, 378-79 (Okla. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 , 107 S.Ct. 3232 , 97 L.Ed.2d 738 (1987). The Oklahoma Constitution also provides greater rights than those secured by the United States Constitution in the arena of parental rights, In the matter of A.E., E.E., E.E, R.E., A.E., and E.E. v. Oklahoma, 743 P.2d 1041, 1046-48 (Okla.1987). Queen v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., 365 S.E.2d 375, 383 (W.Va.1987) (involved wrongful, termination and due process); People, ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553 , 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 , [846-47], 503 N.E.2d 492, 494-95 (1986) (involved first amendment rights and public nuisance); W. Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 512 Pa. 23 , 515 A.2d 1331, 1333 (1986) (involved first amendment rights and political solicitation); Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Mont.1986) (involved the right to receive welfare benefits); Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495, 500 (Mont.1985) (involved the right to petition the government for redress of grievances); Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 726 (Wyo.1985), cert. dismissed, 476 U.S. 1110 , 106 S.Ct. 1961 , 90 L.Ed.2d 647 (1986) (involved zoning ordinance); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Lyman, 704 P.2d 888, 896 (Hawaii 1985) (involved condemnation action); Fischer v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 509 Pa. 293 , 502 A.2d 114, 121 (1985) (involved public funding of abortions); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287 , 450 A.2d 925, 932 (1982) (involved the funding of abortions); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672 , 255 S.E.2d 859, 864 (1979) (involved public school financing); Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473 , 378 A.2d 553 -54 (1977) (involved confinement of mental patients); Planned Parenthood v. Canniziaro, 204 N.J.Super.Ct. 531, 499 A.2d 535 , 538 (Ch.Div.1985) (involved first amendment rights and right to picket).

.Turner v. City of Lawton, see note 5, supra; In re McNaught, 1 Okl.Crim. 528, 99 P. 241, 254 (1909).

. See, Stephany v. Wagner, 835 F.2d 497, 500 (3rd Cir.1987).

. People, ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., see note 5, supra.

. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 , 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3476 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1201, 1214 (1983).

. Jury instruction number 13 provides in pertinent part:

"... 1. If you find in favor of the plaintiff against one of the defendants on either two or all three of her causes of action, and fill-in an amount of actual damages and an amount of punitive damages in the blank provided for two or all three causes of action, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover from that individual defendant only the largest number you have inserted for actual damages under the two or three causes of action and the largest number you have inserted for punitive damages for the two or three causes of action. In other words, if you insert actual damages in two or three causes of action against one defendant those numbers are not cumulative and that defendant will only have to pay to the plaintiff the largest number for actual and the largest number for punitive damages. This rule applies equally to all three defendants and a judgment will thereby be rendered against one, two or all three defendants, or against none of the defendants ...”

. The journal entry dated September 10, 1984 provides in pertinent part:

"The Court finds that the actual damages on the three (3) causes of action of Plaintiff overlap each other and that, pursuant to agreement of the parties, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for actual damages against each Defendant in the highest amount for actual damages on the verdict form for the Defendant, which is, on each Defendant, the sum of Two Hundred Five Thousand Dollars ($205,-000.00). The Court further finds that the punitive damages on the separate causes of action are overlapping and that, pursuant to agreement of counsel, the highest punitive damage award on each Defendant’s verdict form is the amount that will be rendered as a judgment against such Defendant, and further finds that the highest such award is the same on all three (3) Defendant’s verdict forms and is One Hundred Eighty-Five Thousand Dollars ($185,000.00).”

The jury verdict dated March 16, 1984 provides in pertinent part:

"... 1. [] In favor of the plaintiff, and against this defendant on her cause of action for publication of private facts, and fix recovery at $205,000 actual damages, and $185,000 punitive damages ...”

"... 2. [] In favor of the plaintiff, and against this defendant on her cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion, and fix recovery at $114,000 actual damages, and $120,000 punitive damages ...”

"... 3. [] In favor of the plaintiff and against this defendant on her cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fix recovery at $122,000 actual damages, and $81,000 punitive damages ...”