The opinion
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REHEARING
IRWIN, Chief Justice.
The city urges on rehearing that the law in effect before the 1963 amendment to our statutes invested it with a riparian right to the reasonable use of the stream waters in question.
There is little, if any, dissent from the generally accepted view that riparian status does not entitle a municipality to abstract stream water for distribution to its inhabitants for domestic purposes. Such abstraction is deemed to fall outside the ambit of a riparian owner’s traditional right to make a reasonable use of the water. We agree with this view and accordingly hold that the city’s riparian status *756 does not afford any basis for its claim to the stream water of Elm Creek. Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514 , 19 S.E.2d 700 , 141 A.L.R. 633 ; Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79 , 16 S.E.2d 449 ; Harrell v. City of Conway, 224 Ark. 100 , 271 S.W.2d 924 ; 56 Am.Jur., Waters, § 347, p. 783; 56 Am.Jur. Waterworks, § 43, p. 949; 94 C.J.S. Waters § 226, p. 7; Annotation in 141 A.L.R. 639 . Our decision in Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 197 Okl. 499 , 172 P.2d 1002 , is not in point here and does not support the city’s claim. That case merely holds that a riparian proprietor may convey to another the right to a reasonable use of stream water on non-riparian land. Nor is City of Stillwater v. Cundiff, 184 Okl. 375 , 87 P.2d 947 , applicable here. There we dealt with a city’s proprietary claim to water rather than with the usufructuary right of a riparian owner.
City also contends the district did not comply with the pre-1963 statutory conditions precedent for the perfection of a water right, i. e., hydrographic survey and adjudication proceedings. We hold said conditions precedent were procedural requirements, which have been eliminated by the 1963 amendments to the pertinent sections of Title 82. No one has a vested right in any particular mode of procedure for the enforcement or defense of his rights. Hence the general rule that statutes will be construed to be prospective only does not apply to statutes affecting procedure; but such statutes, unless the contrary intention is clearly expressed or implied, apply to all actions falling within their terms, whether the right of action existed before or accrued after the enactment. Shelby-Downard Asphalt Co. v. Enyart, 67 Okl. 237 , 170 P. 708 ; Fry v. Wolfe, 106 Okl. 289 , 234 P. 191 .
BERRY, V. C. J., and DAVISON, WILLIAMS, JACKSON, HODGES, LAVENDER and McINERNEY, JJ„ concur.
BLACKBIRD, J., concurs in results.