concluding that a press conference held by a district attorney to distribute information about a drug investigation was “official because [it] concern[s] the investigative function of the office.”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that a press conference held by a district attorney to distribute information about a drug investigation was “official because [it] concern[s] the investigative function of the office.”
- stating Athe damage by reputational harm which goes unredressed because of the fair report privilege defense must be subordinated to the larger societal interests in the values which the privilege protects@
- holding fair and accurate/true/honest report absolutely privileged
- holding fair and aecurate/true/honest report absolutely privileged
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SIMMS, Justice,
concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I agree with Justice Summers in that part of his writing which refuses to recognize that a press conference called by a district attorney for the obvious purpose of berating an announced political opponent is an “official function” of the office. To so hold, as does the majority, creates a situation where an incumbent district attorney may speak about any matter remotely connected with his office during his campaign with immunity, while his opponent is not so blessed. Likewise, publication by the media in one instance is protected and not protected in the other.
Nor do Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 , 100 S.Ct. 2814 , 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) and McCormick v. Specter, 220 Pa.Super. 19 , 275 A.2d 688 (1971) support this thesis. Richmond deals with the issue of open and public trials, while McCormick treated statements made by a district attorney about a pending investigation in his office dealing with the plaintiffs business dealings with the City of Philadelphia. The Pennsylvania court wrote: “Thus, given the great potential for harm, the privilege must be limited to those statements and actions which are in fact “closely related” to the performance of those official duties”. A statement made purely for political purposes does not meet this test.
I believe the majority reaches the correct result, but for a different reason.
In my opinion, the offending statement at issue was, at most, libel per quod, and the appellant was required to plead special damages. The statement is susceptible of both a defamatory and an innocent meaning. There is no indication that Wright was engaged in the sale of drugs, merely that the officers were “trying” to make a buy. This statement, standing alone, does not impute a crime to Wright, nor is the statement susceptible of but one opprobrious meaning.
I would therefore affirm the trial court.