The opinion
*216 Bobbitt, J.,
concurring: Without elaboration the following considerations convince me that the intent of the testatrix is rightly determined in the decision of the Court.
1. The provisions for Sam Hubbard: “& Sam Hubbard is to have the Bonds & on Hundred Dollars.” Here, it will be noted, she does not refer to “all the bonds” or “my bonds.” In my opinion, “the Bonds” refers to the bonds with which “Sam Hubbard” is identified, namely, the bonds in her possession, presumably purchased by her, made out to “Mrs. Christian G. Pate or Mr. J. Sam Hubbard.” (Emphasis added.)
2. The context: I quote only the provisions immediately preceding and immediately following: “. . . Mary Archer is to have. 2. hundred, in cash. & Sam Hubbard is to have the Bonds & on Hundred Dollars & Nita H. Davis is to have 2. hundred dollars, in cash. & . . .” There is nothing here to suggest that Sam Hubbard is to be the chief beneficiary of the estate. The inference I draw is that these beneficiaries are being treated substantially on the same basis.
3. The addition of the words: “& on Hundred Dollars.” It seems to me altogether unreasonable to infer that the intent of the testatrix was to leave Sam Hubbard $6,000.00 of U. S. Bonds and add to a bequest of this value, “& on Hundred Dollars.”
4. The provision: “I want fifteen hundred dollars in Savings Bonds for flowers to the grave.” We are not concerned with the validity of this provision. Rather, we are concerned solely with ascertaining the intent of the testatrix. In my view, she did not think she had disposed of bonds other than those with which Sam Hubbard was definitely identified.
5. The three $100.00 bonds made out to “Mrs. Christian G. Pate or Mr. J. Sam Hubbard” were kept in a separate envelope. The six $1,000.00 bonds made out to Mrs. Christian Gay Pate were in another envelope marked, “Mrs. W. L. Pate, personal account.” The two sets of bonds were separated physically and separated in her thoughts. Having purchased the three $100.00 bonds, having kept them in her possession, in a separate envelope, with no delivery of these bonds in her lifetime, it seems clear to me that these were the bonds intended for Sam Hubbard when she made provision for him: “& Sam Hubbard is to have the Bonds & on Hundred Dollars.” True, resolving a question long mooted, this Court held in Ervin v. Conn, and Bank v. Frederickson, 225 N.C. 267 , 34 S.E. 2d 402 , that the State law otherwise applicable to gifts inter vivos was superseded by the Federal Statutes and regulations concerning such bonds and that the alternate payee, even though no delivery had been made during the lifetime of the purchaser, was entitled thereto. Even so, the State law prevails to the extent that such bonds are a part of the decedent purchaser’s estate for inheritance tax purposes. Watkins v. Shaw, Comr. of Revenue, 234 N.C. 96 , 65 S.E. 2d 881 . It seems unrea *217 sonable to assume that Mrs. Pate was aware of these refinements. She had not given the three $100.00 bonds to Sam Hubbard during her lifetime. She thought she was doing so by her Will, albeit this result was actually accomplished by operation of law under authority of Ervin v. Conn, and Bank v. Frederickson, supra.
In short, my view is that the testatrix purchased the three $100.00 U. S. Bonds, had them made payable to herself or J. Sam Hubbard, thereby earmarking these bonds for him and identifying him with them, and that she had these bonds and these only in mind when she provided: “& Sam Hubbard is to have the Bonds & on Hundred Dollars.” (Emphasis added.)