concluding that eyewitness identification of the defendant was not tainted by media publication of the defendant’s photograph and that any prejudice that may have resulted from admission of the witnesses’ identifications was speculative and did not rise to the level of fundamental error
How later courts described this case
- concluding that eyewitness identification of the defendant was not tainted by media publication of the defendant’s photograph and that any prejudice that may have resulted from admission of the witnesses’ identifications was speculative and did not rise to the level of fundamental error
- affirming denial of motion to suppress where the defendant “presented no evidence to establish that the informants asked any questions or initiated any conversations about the murder”
- “The inquiry into such possible Sixth Amendment violations requires that this Court determine whether (1) the inmates were acting as agents of the police, and (2) the informants affirmatively and deliberately elicited the incriminating statements.”
- affirming trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SILAK, J.,
concurring, and concurring in result part VIII. D.
I concur fully in the Court’s opinion, except that I concur in the result in Part VIII(D). In my view the requirement found in the current version of I.C. § 19-2827(c)(3), to consider “whether the sentence of death is excessive,” requires the same type of excessiveness analysis that the Court has performed in non-capital cases. See, e.g., State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 940 , 877 P.2d 905, 911 (1994); State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141 , 814 P.2d 401 (1991), overruled on other grounds, State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 394 , 825 P.2d 482, 491 (1992). Applying that analysis to the present case, I conclude that the sentence is not excessive.