the fact finder may disregard the corporate form, thereby making individuals liable for corporate debts or making corporate assets reachable to satisfy obligations of the individual
How later courts described this case
- the fact finder may disregard the corporate form, thereby making individuals liable for corporate debts or making corporate assets reachable to satisfy obligations of the individual
- same regarding I.C. § 12-121
- regarding attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121
- “court can find no reason in law or logic to limit the application of the alter ego doctrine ...” to traditional veil piercing but not reverse veil piercing
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DONALDSON, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The respondent requested attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and the majority while denying them, states they may be awarded in an appeal under certain circumstances. I cannot agree with that part of the majority opinion that holds that I.C. § 12-121 authorizes attorney fees on appeal. This statute provides that a “judge” may award attorney fees to the prevailing party in any civil action. I do not believe that this statute empowers “justices” of the Idaho Supreme Court to award attorney’s fees on appeal to the prevailing party in a civil action. I am unable to find definitions in the Idaho Constitution or the Idaho Code of “judge” and “justice.” There are several sections in the Constitution 1 and statutes in the Code, 2 however, where district “judges” are impliedly distinguished from Supreme Court “justices.” The Idaho Constitution refers to members of the Supreme Court as “justices” 3 and members of the district bench as “judges.” 4 Also, Title 1, Ch. 2 of the Idaho Code, which pertains to the Idaho Supreme Court, refers to members of the Supreme Court as “justices.” Title 1, Ch. 7 of the Idaho Code, which pertains to the Idaho district courts, refers to members of the district bench as “judges.” The conclusion to be drawn from the examples cited above is that the term “judge” is not to be considered synonymous with the term “justice.” In addition, the statute states that “the judge” may award attorney’s fees. The statute reads in the singular, i. e. one judge. Idaho Code § 73-114 establishes the rule of construction that “ . . the singular number includes the plural . .” This rule of construction is not mandatory, but merely instructive, and is to be implemented only when necessary to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature. C. Forsman Real Estate Co. v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511 , 547 P.2d 1116 (1976). I cannot say that it is necessary to apply this rule of construction to I.C. § 12-121 to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature. Therefore the singular number in I.C. § 12-121 should not include the plural. If the statute can only be read in the singular, it does not allow this Court to award attorney’s fees. Article 5, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution provides that any decision of the Supreme Court must be announced by a majority of the justices. Under the statute one justice rather than a majority of the justices could award attorney’s fees, a result repugnant to art. 5, § 6. I do not believe that it was the intent of the legislature to empower this Court to award attorney’s fees on appeal by enactment of I.C. § 12-121. The respondent’s request for attorney’s fees should be denied.
. Idaho Const, art. 5, §§ 6, 17, 25, and 27.
. E. g„ I.C. §§ 1-1903, -2001, -2002, -2004, -2005, -2006, -2007, -2009.
. Idaho Const, art. 5, §§ 6, 7, 8, 17, 25, and 27.
. Idaho Const, art. 5, §§ 6, 9, 11, 12, 17, 23, 25, and 27.