Opinion

Sears v. Hull

  • 192 Ariz. 65
  • 273 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 36
  • 961 P.2d 1013
  • 1998 Ariz. LEXIS 75
Court
Arizona Supreme Court
Filed
Jul 16, 1998
Status
Published
Author
Jones
On the bench
McGregor, Jones, Zlaket, Feldman, Martone
Cited by
96 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.7%

finding allegations of harm that proposed gaming facility would expose plaintiffs’ children to “conduct contrary to the[ir] values,” “result in urban crowding, traffic and stresses,” and cause “economic loss” to surrounding homes and businesses, “alleged only generalized harm rather than any distinct and palpable injury”

How later courts described this case

  • finding allegations of harm that proposed gaming facility would expose plaintiffs’ children to “conduct contrary to the[ir] values,” “result in urban crowding, traffic and stresses,” and cause “economic loss” to surrounding homes and businesses, “alleged only generalized harm rather than any distinct and palpable injury”
  • holding 19 that plaintiffs’ nuisance allegations based on “urban crowding, traffic and stresses which 20 will detract from the quality of their immediate community” stated “only generalized harm 21 rather than any distinct and palpable injury”
  • holding the court should only apply the doctrine narrowly and only under exceptional circumstances
  • rejecting argument that legislators had standing to attack compact when legislature expressly authorized the governor to enter into gaming contracts; under these circumstances this case no longer presented issues of constitutional moment requiring court to waive standing requirement

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

JONES, Vice Chief Justice,

specially concurring:

I concur in the judgment and rationale of the court. I write separately, however, to remind the parties that today’s opinion, once again, does not resolve the federal question identified and discussed in the concurring opinion in Salt River Pimar-Maricopa Indian Community v. Hull, 190 Ariz. 97,105 , 945 P.2d 818, 826 (1997). That discussion, though still valid, need not be repeated here.

The issue, briefly stated, is whether IGRA authorizes the tribe, via state compact, to conduct certain forms of Class III gaming on tribal land in spite of Arizona’s long-standing prohibition against such gaming on non-tribal land.

In even simpler terms, the issue is whether the state may approve, and whether the tribe may conduct, gaming activity which the state, by law, has otherwise declared illegal. Plaintiffs raised the issue, but the court holds that plaintiffs lack judicial standing to bring the action. Accordingly, the court must dismiss the case without reaching the controlling federal question.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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