Opinion

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.

  • 530 U.S. 133
  • 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 406
  • 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 3474
  • 2000 Daily Journal DAR 6199
  • 68 U.S.L.W. 4480
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Jun 12, 2000
Status
Published
Author
Ginsburg
On the bench
Ginsburg, O'Connor, Ggns-Burg
Cited by
12,287 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.6%

explaining that "[fjirst, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination," which shifts to respondent the burden to "produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason .... This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.' ” If this burden is met, the plaintiff "must be afforded the 'opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.' ” (internal citations omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that "[fjirst, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination," which shifts to respondent the burden to "produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason .... This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.' ” If this burden is met, the plaintiff "must be afforded the 'opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.' ” (internal citations omitted)
  • explaining that “[f]irst, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination,” which shifts to respondent the burden to “produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. . . . This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.’” If this burden is met, the plaintiff “must be afforded the ‘opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.’” (internal citations omitted)
  • stating, in age discrimination case in which plaintiff-employee was not promoted, while younger employees were, that “the plaintiff may attempt to establish that he was the victim of intentional discrimination ‘by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence’ and concluding that plaintiff-employee “made a substantial showing that [employer’s] explanation was false” based on evidence employee presented about his own job performance, without discussing any evidence concerning employee’s qualifications as compared to the qualifications of those who were promoted
  • explaining that the burden-shifting analysis in an employment discrimination case first requires the plaintiff to come forward with a prima facie case of discrimination; if a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the employer to present evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action; once the employer has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the employer’s articulated reasons are merely a pretext for discrimination.

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Davis v. Dunn Construction Co., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (2012)

    However, Reeves is distinguishable from this case because Reeves involved a "substantial corpus of gender-derogatory language” where the comments were made "on a daily basis.
    District Court, N.D. AlabamaMay 24, 2012Read it
  • Distinguished by Sweet v. Abbott Foods, Inc., Unpublished Decision (12-27-2005), 2005 Ohio 6880 (2005)

    we distinguished Reeves on the basis that it involved appellate review of a denial of a defendant-employer's motion for a judgment as a matter of law, not a motion for summary judgment.
    Ohio Court of AppealsDec 27, 2005Read it
  • Distinguished by Khazzaka v. University of Scranton, 148 F. App'x 72 (2005)

    530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) is inapposite.
    Court of Appeals for the Third CircuitJul 13, 2005Read it
  • Distinguished by Smith v. UNC-HOSPITALS, 167 N.C. App. 371 (2004)

    We conclude that Reeves is inapplicable to the instant case.
    Court of Appeals of North CarolinaDec 7, 2004Read it

The opinion

Justice Ginsburg,

concurring.

The Court today holds that an employment discrimination plaintiff may survive judgment as a matter of law by submitting two categories of evidence: first, evidence establishing a “prima facie case,” as that term is used in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 (1973); and second, evidence from which a rational factfinder could conclude that the employer’s proffered explanation for its actions was false. Because the Court of Appeals in this case plainly, and erroneously, required the plaintiff to offer some evidence beyond those two categories, no broader holding is necessary to support reversal.

I write separately to note that it may be incumbent on the Court, in an appropriate case, to define more precisely the circumstances in which plaintiffs will be required to submit evidence beyond these two categories in order to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law. I anticipate that such circumstances will be uncommon. As the Court notes, it is a principle of evidence law that the jury is entitled to treat a party’s dishonesty about a material fact as evidence of culpability. Ante, at 147. Under this eommonsense principle, evidence suggesting that a defendant accused of illegal discrimination has chosen to give a false explanation for its actions gives rise to a rational inference that the defendant could be masking its actual, illegal motivation. Ibid. Whether the defendant was in fact motivated by discrimination is of course for the finder of fact to decide; that is the lesson of St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502 (1993). But the inference remains — unless it is conclusively *155 demonstrated, by evidence the district court is required to credit on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, see ante, at 151, that discrimination could not have been the defendant’s true motivation. If such conclusive demonstrations are (as I suspect) atypical, it follows that the ultimate question of liability ordinarily should not be taken from the jury once the plaintiff has introduced the two categories of evidence described above. Because the Court’s opinion leaves room for sueh further elaboration in an appropriate case, I join it in full.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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