holding that an order was not final where the “order stated that the court would end the cause after [a] final accounting was reviewed and approved,” but “did not say that the cause was ended,” reasoning that “[t]his language indicates that the trial court considered that the cause was still open”
How later courts described this case
- holding that an order was not final where the “order stated that the court would end the cause after [a] final accounting was reviewed and approved,” but “did not say that the cause was ended,” reasoning that “[t]his language indicates that the trial court considered that the cause was still open”
- holding that, despite the label “Final Order,” the trial judge’s order was not final for purposes of appeal because it specifically stated the judge “will end the cause” after he reviewed and approved a final accounting, which was not a ministerial act in that proceeding
- holding that the trial court erred in ordering conservator of deceased husband’s estate to pay wife in order to “purge [the deceased husband] of contempt”
- holding that trial courts do not have jurisdiction to remedy violations of injunctions when divorce has been abated by a party’s death
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*76 ANNUNZIATA, J.,
concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part.
I join the principal opinion with respect to Parts U.A., U.B.2., U.B.3., and II.C. With respect to Part II.B.1,1 concur in the judgment to affirm on the ground that Code § 20-103(A)(vii) provided the trial court the authority to appoint a conservator in this case. With respect to Part II.B.4,1 concur in the judgment to hold husband’s estate responsible for the conservator’s fees accrued up to the time of husband’s death. However, I would hold that the trial court’s authority to award the conservator’s fees emanates from Code § 20-99(5), not Rule 4:12, and join the dissent with respect to its reasoning and conclusion that Rule 4:12, and the contempt power arising from the Rule, do not authorize the appointment of a conservator. I have not found any federal or state case or statute which authorizes the appointment of a conservator as a sanction for the violation of a court’s order to answer discovery requests related to the party’s estate and financial affairs.