Opinion

BMG Direct Marketing, Inc. v. Peake

  • 49 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 84
  • 178 S.W.3d 763
  • 2005 Tex. LEXIS 846
  • 2005 WL 3077425
Court
Texas Supreme Court
Filed
Nov 18, 2005
Status
Published
Author
Hecht
On the bench
O'Neill, Jefferson, Hecht, Brister, Medina, Green, Johnson, Willett, Wainwright
Cited by
124 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.6%

noting, however, that "an adequate legal remedy may render equitable claims of unjust enrichment and equitable defenses of voluntary-payment unavailable” and citing Matagorda County, 52 S.W.3d 128, 133-135 (Tex.2000)

How later courts described this case

  • noting, however, that "an adequate legal remedy may render equitable claims of unjust enrichment and equitable defenses of voluntary-payment unavailable” and citing Matagorda County, 52 S.W.3d 128, 133-135 (Tex.2000)
  • stating that payment of judgment without expressed intent to appeal moots appeal but that payment with that type of expression does not
  • explaining that, since 1890, Texas courts have held the “usury statute prevented [the] voluntary-payment defense”
  • contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice; therefore, “you have this paramount public policy to consider-that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Justice HECHT,

concurring.

I agree with the Court that “the voluntary-payment doctrine’s full-knowledge requirement has been met” in this case, and that “the classmembers’ unlawful-penalty allegation, under the circumstances presented here, does not implicate the type of fraud, duress or coercion that would preclude the voluntary-payment defense”. 1 All of the class’s arguments thus having been rejected, and a dispositive defense having been conclusively established, the class cannot proceed on any claim it has asserted (those being only for damages, not injunctive relief), and the case is at an end. Because this is an interlocutory appeal from a class certification order, this Court cannot issue a judgment on the merits, so it remands the case to the trial court with the elliptic direction to “determine the effect of BMG’s voluntary-payment defense on the requirements for class certification”. 2 Since “dispositive issues should be resolved by the tidal court before certification is considered”, 3 and now the Court has resolved a dispositive issue for the trial court, there is nothing left for the trial court to do but dismiss the case. I concur in remanding the case for that purpose.

. Ante at 778.

. Id. at 778.

.State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 156 S.W.3d 550, 557 (Tex.2004).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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