determining that because no direct relationship existed between plaintiff and any outrageous conduct, plaintiff was neither a “direct victim” nor present at the time of the conduct, and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was dismissed; Upchurch v. The New York Times Co., 431 S.E.2d 558, 561 (S.C. 1993) (holding that claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress are limited to egregious conduct toward a plaintiff, and the conduct must be directed at the plaintiff or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware)
How later courts described this case
- determining that because no direct relationship existed between plaintiff and any outrageous conduct, plaintiff was neither a “direct victim” nor present at the time of the conduct, and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was dismissed; Upchurch v. The New York Times Co., 431 S.E.2d 558, 561 (S.C. 1993) (holding that claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress are limited to egregious conduct toward a plaintiff, and the conduct must be directed at the plaintiff or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware)
- finding a criminal act (rape) outside the scope of employment for purposes of respondeat superior and declining to extend non-delegable duty doctrine to make institutional caretaker entity vicariously liable for crime committed against an incapacitated ward by the caretaker’s employee
- declining to follow Siropes because the District of Columbia does not follow the common carrier rule
- holding each incident of rape was separate wrongful act giving rise to separate “claim” under statutory cap limiting damages for "each claim” against governmental entity
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE HARRISON
specially concurring.
I concur in the result reached by majority in this opinion holding that the District Court erred in granting partial summary judgment based on Restatement (Second) of Agency § 214. As noted in the opinion, this Court has not previously adopted this section as law in Montana and, in my opinion, it is unfortunate that the District Court did in this case.
In concurring with the result of this case, I do not in any manner approve, condone or support the apparent indifferent hiring practices employed by the State of Montana in this case. The fact situation of this case clearly illustrates the unconcerned hiring practices implemented by the State — it is appalling that it clearly took little or no interest in the character or integrity of this defendant who was hired to care for our disabled or disadvantaged. The State’s investigation of potential employees should have prevented the hiring of such a man, who, during the course of his employment with the State of Montana, brought discredit not only to himself and to the institution but also to the other employees of that institution who are devoted and who truly care for our unfortunate citizens. The citizens of this State who suffer the misfortune of having family members in such institutions deserve both the peace of mind and the assurance that their loved ones are safe and well cared for.