holding that requiring officers to include all exculpatory information in a search warrant affidavit “places an extraordinary burden on law enforcement officers, compelling them to follow up and include in a warrant affidavit every hunch and detail of an investigation in the futile attempt 10 No. 23-1329, Marvaso, et al. v. Sanchez to prove the negative proposition that no potentially exculpatory evidence had been excluded”
How later courts described this case
- holding that requiring officers to include all exculpatory information in a search warrant affidavit “places an extraordinary burden on law enforcement officers, compelling them to follow up and include in a warrant affidavit every hunch and detail of an investigation in the futile attempt 10 No. 23-1329, Marvaso, et al. v. Sanchez to prove the negative proposition that no potentially exculpatory evidence had been excluded”
- explaining, in the context of a civil rights action filed by a plaintiff who had been the subject of a criminal investigation, that “the due process protections provided to defendants prior to trial under Brady” do not apply to the warrant process “under the guise of a Franks analysis”
- rejecting inference that due process protections provided to defendants prior to trial under Bra dy applies to the warrant process under the guise of Franks, thereby entitled subject of a search warrant to disclosure of all potentially exculpatory information
- explaining that the omission of disputed facts will “very rare[ly]” warrant the re-evaluation of probable cause in a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
COLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Although I concur in the majority’s opinion, I write separately to address the majority’s discussion of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). I do not believe that the district court’s thoughtful opinion misconstrued the holding of that case.
The majority states that the district court imputed the rationale of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) into the warrant process. I do agree with the majority’s discussion distinguishing the warrant process from the Brady protections arising from the trial process; however, I do not believe that the district court attempted to apply Brady to the warrant process.
The district court held that a genuine issue of material fact arose as to whether the rule established by the Supreme Court in Franks was violated by Detective Gabringer’s omission of information in the affidavit. Although I disagree with that holding — I believe that even with the addition of the omitted statements, probable cause existed as a matter of law — I do not read the district court’s statements as an attempt to redefine Franks .
As the majority states, under Franks , the inquiry does not continue if the court finds that the exclusion of the allegedly false statement (or in this ease, omission of material information) does not result in a lack of probable cause. I would thus hold that Detective Gabringer’s omission of the fact that he had attempted unsuccessfully to get Dr. Mays to write a prescription for him would not have resulted in a lack of probable cause.