recognizing that courts may deny a motion to amend if the amendment would be futile
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that courts may deny a motion to amend if the amendment would be futile
- holding that a court need not “accept legal conclusions cast as factual allegations[,]” or “inferences drawn by [the] plaintiff if those inferences are not supported by the facts set out in the complaint”
- noting that “[t]he challenger bears the burden of showing that the statute is not a rational means of advancing a legitimate government purpose”
- holding that plaintiffs must plead a “threshold requirement” of due process claims: “that the government has interfered with a cognizable liberty or property interest”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I, too, agree fully with the per curiam opinion, but do not join my colleagues’ concurrence with its spirited criticism of the Supreme Court’s long-standing approach to claims of economic liberty. Although by no means unsympathetic to their criticism nor critical of their choice to express their perspective, I am reluctant to set forth my own views on the wisdom of such a broad area of the Supreme Court’s settled jurisprudence that was not challenged by the petitioner.