recognizing that "Disability does not mean that a claimant must vegetate in a dark room excluded from all forms of human and social activity. . . . It is well established that sporadic or transitory activity does not disprove disability"
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that "Disability does not mean that a claimant must vegetate in a dark room excluded from all forms of human and social activity. . . . It is well established that sporadic or transitory activity does not disprove disability"
- finding that an ALJ erred in drawing an inference from “sporadic and transitory activities,” such as shopping and two hunting outings, “to a lack of disabling pain”
- finding that ALJ could not consider claimant’s occasional hunting trips in RFC
- noting that court reviewing denial of Social Security disability benefits “retain[s] a responsibility to scrutinize the entire record and to reverse or remand if the ... decision is not supported by substantial evidence”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Sadaka v. Astrue, 886 F. Supp. 2d 436 (2012)
Sadaka cites Smith to the contrary, but that case is inapposite.
The opinion
*973 ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the record before us does not contain substantial evidence in support of the Secretary’s decision to deny Leo R. Smith disability benefits. For this reason, I subscribe to the conclusion that the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary may not be sustained. I am not convinced, however, that the same record which is inadequate to support the Secretary’s conclusion nonetheless provides sufficient grounds for an award of summary judgment in favor of Smith.
The record contains some evidence supportive of the Secretary’s determination that Smith is not disabled. The report of Dr. Herberg concludes that Smith suffers from only a slight debility. Standing alone, Dr. Herberg’s opinion would appear to corroborate the Secretary’s action. But, as the majority points out, a reviewing court is obliged to consider the entire record, and to determine whether the evidence taken as a whole supports the administrator’s decision. In this case, Dr. Beers’ conclusion that Smith is permanently disabled and unable to seek or hold gainful employment stands opposed to the medical opinion of Dr. Her-berg.
In my view, the Secretary’s denial of disability benefits is deficient in that it fails to reconcile these contrary medical opinions. In Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 , 95 S.Ct. 1133 , 43 L.Ed.2d 403 (1975), a hearing examiner had recommended to the Secretary that an application for disability benefits should be denied, but had “give[n] no clue as to why he chose to accept certain medical evidence and reject contradictory evidence.” 500 F.2d at 312 . Although we affirmed the Secretary’s decision not to grant the application, we observed: “In our view an examiner’s findings should be as comprehensive and analytical as feasible and, where appropriate, should include a statement of subordinate factual foundations on which ultimate factual conclusions are based, so that a reviewing court may know the basis for the decision.” Id.
The report of the administrative law judge, on which the Secretary relied in the present case, advances no adequate reason for preferring the recommendation of Dr. Herberg over that of Dr. Beers. Because the record is devoid of other evidence justifying a determination of no disability, I believe that this unresolved conflict makes it inappropriate for us to conclude that the record considered as whole contains substantial evidence to support the Secretary’s determination.
At the same time, the inconsistencies in the medical opinions cast doubt on whether Smith has carried the burden of proof, imposed on claimants by 42 U.S.C. § 423 , of demonstrating that he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity. See Woods v. Finch, 428 F.2d 469, 470 (3d Cir. 1970); Forte v. Matthews, 427 F.Supp. 187, 190 (E.D.Pa.1977). Rather than enter summary judgment in favor of Smith, I would remand the case to the district court, with instructions that the district judge, in turn, *974 remand to the Secretary for reconsideration of the medical testimony. 1 While I share the majority’s concern over the additional delay that would accompany such a procedure, I do not belieye that the sympathetic plight of this claimant relieves us of our obligation to ensure that the claimant has adequately established that he is entitled to benefits. See, e. g., Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1979) (remand for ALJ to explain weight and credibility of evidence before him); Barats v. Weinberger, 383 F.Supp. 276 (E.D.Pa.1974) (remand proper where clinical evidence is conflicting and conflict was not resolved by administrative law judge in his findings); cf. Smith v. Weinberger, 394 F.Supp. 1002 (D.Md.1975) (remand proper, even in face of long delay in processing claimant’s application, where court is not satisfied that claimant has carried burden of proof).
The procedural posture of this case also leads me to question the appropriateness of an outright reversal of the district court’s decision. Although Smith moved for summary judgment the first time his case was before the district court, the record does not indicate that he renewed the motion when the district court reopened the case following the remand to the Secretary for additional factfinding. Moreover, the notice of appeal filed by Smith indicates that he objects to the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, rather than to a denial of summary judgment in favor of himself. Mindful that an appellate court’s scope of review is circumscribed by the questions posed by the parties, I would think that our jurisdiction in this case is limited to a consideration of whether the Secretary’s denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence, and that the further question whether Smith had carried his burden is, perhaps unfortunately, beyond our purview. Cf. Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d at 410 (case remanded to agency even though claimant “vigorously urged’! reversal of district court and entry of summary judgment for himself).
Through no fault of his own, Smith’s application for disability has been embroiled in controversy now for seven years. Although this delay is regrettable in the extreme, especially in light of Smith’s considerably less than affluent status, I am not persuaded that this Court can properly reverse the judgment of the district judge and declare that Smith has met the statutorily imposed burden of proof. Rather, I would suggest that the Secretary dispose of Smith’s application as expeditiously as possible, in order to temper the harsh effects of additional delay. Further, I would urge that the Secretary take steps to prevent such extended proceedings in the future.
. The majority suggests that Dr. Herberg’s opinion does not contradict that of Dr. Beers, inasmuch as Dr. Herberg, in focusing on Smith’s spastic colon, may not have considered disabilities stemming from Smith’s ulcer. While I recognize that this- is a possible interpretation of Dr. Herberg’s report, Dr. Herberg’s conclusion that Smith was only slightly disabled might plausibly be construed as standing in direct opposition to Dr. Beers’ recommendation. The ambiguity surrounding Dr. Herberg’s report is, in my view, a further indication that the case should be remanded for reconsideration by the Secretary.