‘‘Every case is ‘limited to its facts,’ if by that phrase one means that the court based its judgment on the facts presented to it. But most cases are also decided with reference to some more general normative principle which extends beyond the specific circumstances of the case before the court. Indeed, it is the existence of such broader norms which distinguishes a decision which is princi- pled and rational from one which is ad hoc and arbi- trary.’’
How later courts described this case
- ‘‘Every case is ‘limited to its facts,’ if by that phrase one means that the court based its judgment on the facts presented to it. But most cases are also decided with reference to some more general normative principle which extends beyond the specific circumstances of the case before the court. Indeed, it is the existence of such broader norms which distinguishes a decision which is princi- pled and rational from one which is ad hoc and arbi- trary.’’
- extending holding in Edwards v. Habib to protect from retaliatory eviction a tenant who had successfully interposed housing code violations as defense in previous eviction proceeding
- “If the housing code were effectuated solely by a system of comprehensive public enforcement, the situation might perhaps be different. But by legislating a system of private remedies conforming to the Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 138 U.S.App.D.C. 369, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925, 91 S.Ct. 186, 27 L.Ed.2d 185 (1970) and Brown v. Southall Realty, 237 A.2d 834 (D.C.1968) decisions, the City Council has made plain that the code is to be enforced in large part through the actions of private tenants.”
- “Once the presumption is established, it is then up to the landlord to rebut it by demonstrating that he is motivated by some legitimate business purpose rather than by the illicit motive which would otherwise be presumed.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBB, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
This controversy between a landlord and a tenant is peculiarly a local matter. By the Court Reorganization Act of 1970 (11 D.C.Code 1971, § 11-101 et seq.) Congress has confided to the local courts jurisdiction over such controversies and the problems they engender. This case comes to us only because of the fortuitous circumstance that the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was entered July 20, 1970, approximately six months before the Court Reorganization Act of July 29, 1970 became effective. See 11 D.C.Code § 11-301(2). I venture to suggest that in light of the congressional intent expressed in the Act we should leave the solution of such local problems to the District of Columbia courts; we should not use this old case in an attempt to impose our views on the local judges.
Turning to the substance of the majority opinion I disagree on several fundamental points.
The landlord, Diamond Housing, served a proper notice to quit on a tenant by sufferance, who refused to pay rent. D.C.Code 1967, § 45-904. In the ensuing action for possession the tenant answered, claiming that the action was retaliatory and demanding a jury trial. The landlord moved for summary judgment, supporting the motion with an affidavit referring to the notice to quit and stating that the landlord was unwilling to make any repairs to the property and did not presently wish to rent it. No affidavit in opposition was filed by the tenant, and the court accordingly granted the motion for summary judgment. I think this ruling was correct, because there was no material issue of fact as to the landlord’s motive.
I cannot accept the proposition espoused by the majority that when a landlord states under oath and without contradiction that he wishes to remove a housing unit from the market it will be presumed that his reasons are “illicit”, unless he is able to prove to the satisfaction of a jury that he is financially unable to make necessary repairs or has some other “substantial business reason” for removing the unit from the market. I find no warrant in law for any such presumption or requirement of proof.
The theory of the majority seems to be that if not an outlaw a landlord is at least a public utility, subject to regulation by the court in conformity with its concept of public convenience and necessity. I reject that notion, which in practical application will commit to the discretion of a jury the management of a landlord’s business and property.
*872 The majority suggests that its decision will promote the development of more and better low-cost housing. This reasoning passes my understanding. In my judgment the majority’s Draconian treatment of landlords will inevitably discourage investment in housing for rental purposes.
I dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.