holding that "the central obligation imposed upon [chief law enforcement officers] by the interim provisions of the Brady Act-the obligation to 'make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt or possession [of a handgun] would be in violation of the law, including research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available and in a national system designated by the Attorney General,' 18 U.S.C. § 922 (s)(2) -is unconstitutional. Extinguished with it, of course, is the duty implicit in the background-check requirement that the [chief law enforcement officer] accept notice of the contents of, and a copy of, the completed Brady 934 Form, which the firearms dealer is required to provide to him, §§ 922(s)(1)(A)(i) (III) and (IV)."
How later courts described this case
- holding that "the central obligation imposed upon [chief law enforcement officers] by the interim provisions of the Brady Act-the obligation to 'make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt or possession [of a handgun] would be in violation of the law, including research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available and in a national system designated by the Attorney General,' 18 U.S.C. § 922 (s)(2) -is unconstitutional. Extinguished with it, of course, is the duty implicit in the background-check requirement that the [chief law enforcement officer] accept notice of the contents of, and a copy of, the completed Brady 934 Form, which the firearms dealer is required to provide to him, §§ 922(s)(1)(A)(i) (III) and (IV)."
- holding unconstitutional the requirement in the Brady Bill that local law enforcement officers conduct background checks of prospective gun purchasers, because the federal government may not commandeer the apparati of state and local governments
- explaining that New York’s holding that Congress cannot compel the states to enforce a federal regulatory program extends to Congress’ inability to conscript state officers directly “to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program”
- holding that Congress could not commandeer state executive officers to enforce federal gun control law
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Johnson v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, 709 F. Supp. 2d 178 (2010)
Plaintiffs argue that the holding in Printz is inapplicable here because LEO-SA does not ask state officers to implement a federal scheme.
Distinguished by Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Wagnon, 402 F.3d 1015 (2005)
Printz and New York are easily distinguishable from the facts at hand, for here the government is not attempting to compel the state to enact or enforce a federal program.
Distinguished by Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1 (2002)
521 U.S. 898, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997), are distinguishable from the situation presented in this case, where a court would appoint a receiver as relief for the Secretary’s continuing failure to discharge properly her fiduciary obligations.
The opinion
Justice O’Connor,
concurring.
Our precedent and our Nation’s historical practices support the Court’s holding today. The Brady Act violates the *936 Tenth Amendment to the extent it forces States and local law enforcement officers to perform background checks on prospective handgun owners and to accept Brady Forms from firearms dealers. See ante, at 922. Our holding, of course, does not spell the end of the objectives of the Brady Act. States and chief law enforcement officers may voluntarily continue to participate in the federal program. Moreover, the directives to the States are merely interim provisions scheduled to terminate November 30, 1998. Note following 18 U. S. C. § 922 . Congress is also free to amend the interim program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with the States if it wishes, as it does with a number of other federal programs. See, e. g., 23 U. S. C. § 402 (conditioning States’ receipt of federal funds for highway safety program on compliance with federal requirements).
In addition, the Court appropriately refrains from deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 5779 (a) (requiring state and local law enforcement agencies to report cases of missing children to the Department of Justice). The provisions invalidated here, however, which directly compel state officials to administer a federal regulatory program, utterly fail to adhere to the design and structure of our constitutional scheme.