holding that exchanging a firearm for drugs could support a conviction for “using” a firearm 44 “during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime” (first and second alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1985), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Hernandez, 80 F.3d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1996))
How later courts described this case
- holding that exchanging a firearm for drugs could support a conviction for “using” a firearm 44 “during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime” (first and second alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1985), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Hernandez, 80 F.3d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1996))
- holding that “use” of a firearm included the exchange of a gun for drugs and noting that simply because “use as a weapon” is the first example “to come to mind when the phrase ‘uses ... a firearm’ is uttered does not preclude us from recognizing that there are other ‘uses’ that qualify as well”
- concluding that defendant “used” his firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) by attempting to trade it for drugs, but noting that “the defendant who ‘uses’ a firearm to scratch his head” cannot receive “punishment under § 924(c)(1) unless it facilitates or furthers the drug crime”
- recognizing that "induce, entice, [and] coerce, though not defined in the statute, are words of common usage that have plain and ordinary meanings."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated on other grounds by Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) — not on the Supreme Court's list
508 U.S. 223 , 238, 113 S.Ct. 2050 , 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993), partially abrogated on other grounds by Bailey v. United States , 516 U.S. 137 , 116 S.Ct. 501 , 133 L.Ed.2d 472
Supreme Court of the United StatesDec 6, 19953 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Bolton, 66 F. App'x 638 (2003)
He is correct to note that Smith is distinguishable in some respects from his case.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion in full because I understand the discussion in Part II-B not to foreclose the possibility that the “in relation to” language of 18 U. S. C. § 924 (c)(1) requires more than mere furtherance or facilitation of a crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime. I agree with the Court that because petitioner’s use of his MAC-10 meets any reasonable construction of the phrase, it is unnecessary to determine in this case the precise contours of “in relation to” as it appears in § 924(c)(1). See ante, at 238.