explaining that we may not consider the claim when a state court states "clearly and expressly" that state law is doing just as much or more work than federal law in its analysis, id. at 733-34, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (quoting Harris v. Reed , 489 U.S. 255, 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) ), whereas we presume the opposite "when the [state-court] decision 'fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion,' " id. at 735, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (quoting Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) )
How later courts described this case
- explaining that we may not consider the claim when a state court states "clearly and expressly" that state law is doing just as much or more work than federal law in its analysis, id. at 733-34, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (quoting Harris v. Reed , 489 U.S. 255, 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) ), whereas we presume the opposite "when the [state-court] decision 'fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion,' " id. at 735, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (quoting Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) )
- stating that, "[i]n all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice"
- explaining that when a petitioner “has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the [petitioner] can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice”
- holding that when "a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated in part, on other grounds by Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) — not on the Supreme Court's list
501 U.S. 722 , 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (holding there is no right to effective counsel in state discretionary or collateral proceedings because there is no right to counsel) abrogated in part by Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 , 132 S. Ct. 1309
Supreme Court of the United StatesMar 20, 20129 citing opinionsother groundsin partunconfirmed confidenceRead itDisagreed with by Fairman v. Anderson, 188 F.3d 635 (1999)
We disagree with the district court’s analysis and application of Coleman.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Haney v. Adams, 641 F.3d 1168 (2011)
501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) is inapplicable.
Distinguished by Jackson v. Holland, 80 F. App'x 392 (2003)
Accordingly, the "adequate and independent state ground” rule of Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), is inapplicable to Jackson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Distinguished by Gunter v. Maloney, 291 F.3d 74 (2002)
501 U.S at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, saying it was inapplicable to this case.
The opinion
Justice White,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the Court and I join in its opinion, but add a few words concerning what occurred below. Harris v. Reed, 489 U. S. 255 (1989), stated that “a procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case ‘ “clearly and expressly” ’ states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar. ” Id., at 263 , quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 327 (1985), in turn quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1041 (1983). If there were nothing before us but the order granting the State’s motion to dismiss for untimeliness, it would be clear enough that the dismissal was based on a procedural default.
But the state court did not grant the State’s explicit request for an early ruling on the motion. Instead, the court delayed ruling on the motion to dismiss, and hence briefs on both the motion and the merits were filed. Six months later, the court “upon consideration whereof” granted the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal. Hence petitioner’s argument that the court studied the merits of the federal claims to determine whether to waive the procedural default, found those claims lacking, and only then granted the motion to dismiss; it is as though the court had said that it was granting the motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely because the federal *758 claims were untenable and provided the court no reason to waive the default.
The predicate for this argument is that on occasion the Virginia Supreme Court waives the untimeliness rule. If that were true, the rule would not be an adequate and independent state ground barring direct or habeas review. Cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 75 (1985). The filing of briefs and their consideration would do no more than buttress the claim that the rule is not strictly enforced.
Petitioner argues that the Virginia court does in fact waive the rule on occasion, but I am not now convinced that there is a practice of waiving the rule when constitutional issues are at stake, even fundamental ones. The evidence is too scanty to permit a conclusion that the rule is no longer an adequate and independent state ground barring federal review. The fact that merits briefs were filed and were considered by the court, without more, does not justify a different conclusion.