explaining that “evidence about the defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse” (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 , 107 S. Ct. 837, 841 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring))
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “evidence about the defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse” (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 , 107 S. Ct. 837, 841 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring))
- stating evidence about the defendants background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987)(OConnor, J., concurring))
- holding that the purpose of mitigating evidence is to ensure that the jury “treat[s] the defendant as a ‘uniquely individual human bein[g]’ and has made a reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence” (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976)) overruled on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)
- holding, in reviewing a case tried in March of 1980, that “evidence about the defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional or mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 223, expressly overruled).
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 20, 2002230 citing opinionsother groundsofficial confidenceRead itAbrogated on other grounds by McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002)
492 U.S. 302, 319, 328 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 26
Abrogated on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)
492 U.S. 302, 324 (1989) ([Defendant’s] mental retardation and history of abuse is thus a two-edged sword: it may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Erik Virgil Hall, 419 P.3d 1042 (2018)
Here, there is no contention that the court misinstructed or failed to instruct the jury; Hall only contends that the State's mischaracterization of mitigation impeded the jury's consideration, so Penry and Hitchcock are inapposite.
Distinguished by People v. Smithey, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 243 (1999)
Penry is distinguishable.
Distinguished by State v. Loyd, 689 So. 2d 1321 (1997)
The Penry rationale is also inapposite because the instruction does not relate to the jury any information personal to the defendant, which could be used as an aggravating or mitigating factor.
Distinguished by Porter v. Dugger, 559 So. 2d 201 (1990)
Because we hold that Penry is inapplicable, there is no basis for relief on this claimed ineffectiveness.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Blackmun joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
As I stated in my separate opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 318-319 , and n. 2 (1989), it is neither logical nor prudent to consider a rule’s retroactive application before the rule itself is articulated. Nor am I at all sure that courts should decide the retroactivity issue if it was not raised below. Cf. Zant v. Moore, 489 U. S. 836, 837 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Finally, I do not support the Court’s assertion, without benefit of argument or briefing on the issue, that Teague's retroactivity principles pertain to capital cases. Cf. Teague, 489 U. S., at 321 , and n. 3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But assuming, arguendo, that those principles do apply, it is clear that the Court’s discussion of the mitigating evidence question, with which I agree, does not establish a “new rule” *350 as that term is used for retroactivity purposes. I thus join Parts I, II-B, and III.
In Part IV-A the Court decides that a rule that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a mentally retarded person ought to apply retroactively. Assuming retroactivity is pertinent, I agree that the first exception to Justice Harlan’s nonretroactivity doctrine “should be understood to cover not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense,” ante, at 330, and that this claim lies within that exception. *
The remaining sections of Part IV adequately and fairly state the competing arguments respecting capital punishment of mentally retarded persons. In my judgment, however, that explication — particularly the summary of the arguments advanced in the Brief for American Association on Mental Retardation et al. as Amici Curiae, ante, at 336-337 — compels the conclusion that such executions are unconstitutional. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety.
Because I believe that retroactivity should not be considered until after a right is established, see Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 318-319 , and n. 2 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), the Court’s rejection of this claim ordinarily would preclude me from agreeing even for purposes of argument that the rule Penry seeks may be applied retroactively. I do so here because the Court has fleshed out the merits of Penry’s claim sufficiently to allow me to reach a contrary conclusion.