explaining that “[i]n the employment context, we have recognized that for certain entry level positions or positions requiring minimal training, statistical comparisons of the racial composition of an employer’s work force to the racial composition of the relevant population may be probative of a pattern of discrimination. But where special qualifications are necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[i]n the employment context, we have recognized that for certain entry level positions or positions requiring minimal training, statistical comparisons of the racial composition of an employer’s work force to the racial composition of the relevant population may be probative of a pattern of discrimination. But where special qualifications are necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task”
- explaining “[t]hat Congress may identify and redress the effects of society-wide discrimination does not mean that, a fortiori, the States and their political subdivisions are free to decide that such remedies are appropriate” because “Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is an explicit constraint on state power, and the States must undertake any remedial efforts in accordance with that provision” (emphasis added)
- stating, in an equal protection case, "[i]ndeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate [purposes] . . . . The test also ensures that the means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was [something inconsistent with the interest]."
- stating, in an equal protection case, “[ijndeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate [purposes] .... The test also ensures that the means chosen ‘fit’ this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was [something inconsistent with the interest].”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Lee v. Randolph County Board of Education, 160 F.R.D. 642 (1995)
the standard for race-conscious relief under City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) and other cases is inapplicable.
Distinguished by L.K. Comstock & Co. v. New York Convention Center Development Corp., 179 A.D.2d 322 (1992)
Nevertheless, it must be noted that Richmond v Croson Co. (488 US 469, supra) is clearly inapplicable to the facts here.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
with whom
Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.
I join Justice Marshall’s perceptive and incisive opinion revealing great sensitivity toward those who have suffered the pains of economic discrimination in the construction trades for so long.
I never thought that I would live to see the day when the city of Richmond, Virginia, the cradle of the Old Confederacy, sought on its own, within a narrow confine, to lessen the stark impact of persistent discrimination. But Richmond, to its great credit, acted. Yet this Court, the supposed bastion of equality, strikes down Richmond’s efforts as though discrimination had never existed or was not demonstrated in this particular litigation. Justice Marshall convincingly discloses the fallacy and the shallowness of that approach. History is irrefutable, even though one might sympathize with those who — though possibly innocent in themselves — benefit from the wrongs of past decades.
*562 So the Court today regresses. I am confident, however, that, given time, it one day again will do its best to fulfill the great promises of the Constitution’s Preamble and of the guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights — a fulfillment that would make this Nation very special.