finding that a provision of the Securities Exchange Act stating that “[t]he district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title” did not preclude application of the FAA to claims brought under the statute
How later courts described this case
- finding that a provision of the Securities Exchange Act stating that “[t]he district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title” did not preclude application of the FAA to claims brought under the statute
- holding that parties could be compelled to arbitrate RICO claims relating to, inter alia, making false statements and omitting material facts where brokerage agreement stated, “any controversy arising out of or relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for me or to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- explaining that the FAA “mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims” but providing that the “mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional command” and that the “burden is on the party opposing arbitration ... to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue”
- recognizing that if Congress intended to limit or prohibit a waiver of a judicial forum with ’regard to a federal statutory cause of action, such “an intent will be deducible from the statute’s text or legislative history or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Torrence v. Murphy, 815 F. Supp. 965 (1993)
482 U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987), upon addressing the arbitrability of claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the United States Supreme Court cast doubt upon the continued viability of
Questioned by Sacco v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 362 (1988)
482 U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987), the Supreme Court cast serious doubt on the continued viability of
Distinguished
Distinguished by Bridgetown Trucking, Inc. v. Acatech Solutions, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 3d 1248 (2016)
BTI argues that Shearson is distinguishable from this case because “the primary purpose of the CFAA’s civil enforcement provision is to complement law enforcement and promote 'deterrence of cyber-crime.
Distinguished by Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 977 (1987)
— U.S.—, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987), which has been relied upon by the Defendants, is also inapposite since it involved the Arbitration Act.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Gaps in the law must, of course, be filled by judicial construction. But after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself. This position reflects both respect for Congress’ role, see Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235, 257-258 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting), and the compelling need to preserve the courts’ limited resources, see B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921).
During the 32 years immediately following this Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427 (1953), each of the eight Circuits that addressed the issue concluded that the holding of Wilko was fully applicable to claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 1 See ante, at 248, n. 6 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). This longstanding interpretation 2 creates a strong presumption, in my view, that any mis *269 take that the courts may have made in interpreting the statute is best remedied by the Legislative, not the Judicial, Branch. The history set forth in Part I of Justice Blackmun’s opinion adds special force to that presumption in this case.
For this reason, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the Court’s judgment that holds Wilko inapplicable to the 1934 Act. Like Justice Blackmun, however, I join Parts I, II, and IV of the Court’s opinion.
It was only after Justice White’s concurrence in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 224 (1985), indicating his “substantial doubt” about Wilko’s applicability to the 1934 Act, that two Circuits held it to be inapplicable. See ante, at 249, n. 8 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
Because I have never been convinced that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws were intended to apply to private transactions negotiated between fully informed parties of relatively equal bargaining strength, see Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U. S. 681, 697 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting), I was not at all surprised by the Court’s decision in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U. S. 506 (1974), refusing to apply the Wilko rule to such a case. See Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F. 2d *269 611, 615-620 (CA7 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice Black-mun has demonstrated, that refusal was not predicated on any perceived difference between the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, and it is thus fair to state that the decision the Court announces today changes a settled construction of the relevant statute.