holding that "if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one who it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit"
How later courts described this case
- holding that "if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one who it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit"
- holding that when a claim involves trademark infringement, a manufacturer or distributor can be contributorily liable if it “intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark” or “continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging' in trademark infringement.”
- holding that appellate court cannot substitute its interpretation of evidence for that of trial court simply because appellate court might give facts another construction, resolve ambiguities differently, and give more sinister construction to certain evidence
- explaining that liability would require showing that defendant “intentionally induced the pharmacists to mislabel generic drugs or, in fact, continued to supply [the drug] to pharmacists whom the petitioners knew were mislabeling generic drugs”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (2008)
456 U.S. at 854, 102 S.Ct. 2182, is inapplicable here, because Tiffany has not alleged that eBay intentionally induced infringement of Tiffany’s marks.
The opinion
Justice Rehnquist,
concurring in the result.
I agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. That court set aside factual findings of the District Court without having found them to be clearly erroneous as required by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I disagree, however, with the Court’s determining for itself that the findings of the District Court were not clearly erroneous. I think in the usual case this is a question best decided by the courts of appeals, who have a good deal more experience with the application of this principle than we do, and I see no reason to make an exception in this case.
I also assume, correctly I hope, that the Court’s discussion of appellate review of trial court findings in bench trials, ante, at 855, is limited to cases in which the appellate court has not found the trial court findings to be “clearly erroneous.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364 (1948), upon which the Court relies, establishes the authority of a reviewing court to make its own findings, contrary to those of the trial court, where it has determined the latter to be “clearly erroneous.”
I agree with the Court that these cases should be remanded to the Court of Appeals to review the District Court’s dismissal of respondent’s claims under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and its state-law claims.