concluding that “[i]t is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that “[i]t is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished”
- holding that an indictment is constitutionally sufficient if it (1) contains the elements of the offense charged, (2) fairly informs the defendant of the charge against him which he must defend, and (3) enables the defendant to plead an acquittal or a conviction in bar of future prosecution for the same offense
- explaining that “an indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge 80 against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense”
- holding that “an indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Mita, 124 Haw. 385 (2010)
We emphasized that Hamling was distinguishable from the circumstances in Wheeler because “the term ‘obscenity’ itself provided a person of common understanding with some notice of the nature of the prohibited conduct.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting.
In 1970 the President’s Commission on Obscenity and Pornography issued its report. Dean William D. Lock-hart was chairman. Eighteen others were members. It was a 646-page report. One member, Charles H. Keat-ing, Jr., filed a dissenting report of some 60 pages with at least as many pages of exhibits. The report contains many references to many facets of sex: e. g., petting, *141 coitus, oral sexuality, masturbation, and homosexual activities.
What petitioners did was to supply the report with a glossary — not in dictionary terms but visually. Every item in the glossary depicted explicit sexual material within the meaning of that term as used in the report. Perhaps we should have no reports on obscenity. But imbedded in the First Amendment is the philosophy that the people have the right to know. * Sex is more important to some than to others but it is of some importance to all. If officials may constitutionally report on obscenity, I see nothing in the First Amendment that allows us to bar the use of a glossary factually to illustrate what the report discusses.
The Constitution of India (Mar. 1, 1963) provides in Art. 19 (1) that “[a]ll citizens shall have the right — (a) to freedom of speech and expression”; but Art. 19 (2) provides that nothing in that clause bars “reasonable restrictions on the exercise” of those rights “in the interests of . . . decency or morality.” Our First Amendment contains no such qualification and certainly when Jefferson and Madison drafted it, sex had as great a potential for vulgarity as for beauty. If they had wanted a federal censor to edit our publications, they certainly would have made it explicit.