finding that counsel for juvenile is entitled to access "to the social records and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court” in its decision on waiver, based on "statute read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel"
How later courts described this case
- finding that counsel for juvenile is entitled to access "to the social records and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court” in its decision on waiver, based on "statute read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel"
- recognizing that “the admonition to function in a ‘parental’ relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness” and holding that a juvenile is entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether juvenile court jurisdiction should be waived before being released to a criminal court for prosecution
- holding that a juvenile court's decision to waive jurisdiction -- without first affording any hearing, any participation or representation of the juvenile, or any statement of reasons on the critical issues prescribed by statute -- violated "basic requirements of due process and fairness"
- holding that a juvenile courfis decision to waive jurisdiction— without first affording any hearing, any participation or representation of the juvenile, or any statement of reasons on the critical issues prescribed by statute — violated “basic requirements of due process and fairness”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by State Ex Rel. Coats v. Rakestraw, 1980 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 145 (1980)
Contrary to the respondent’s holding that consideration of these omitted guidelines is required by Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), an examination of Kent fails to support this holding, and we expressly reject it.1
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Watkins, 423 P.3d 830 (2018)
Because Kent is distinguishable on statutory grounds, its holding has no bearing on the constitutionality of former RCW 13.04.030(1) (2009).
Distinguished by State v. Aalim (Slip Opinion), 150 Ohio St. 3d 489 (2017)
However, this portion of Kent is distinguishable from the facts at issue here.
Distinguished by People v. Salas, 356 Ill. Dec. 442 (2011)
In J.S., our supreme court considered this same argument and held that Kent was inapplicable and that the automatic transfer statute did not violate procedural due process.
Distinguished by Ex Parte EJM, 928 So. 2d 1081 (2005)
Because the facts in Kent are distinguishable from the facts of this case, E.J.M. has not demonstrated that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in this case conflicts with Kent.
The opinion
Me. Justice Stewart,
with whom Me. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Haelan and Me. Justice White join, dissenting.
This case involves the construction of a statute applicable only to the District of Columbia. Our general practice is to leave undisturbed decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concerning the import of legislation governing the affairs of the District. General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U. S. 553, 556 . It appears, however, that two cases decided by the Court of Appeals subsequent to its decision in the present case may have considerably modified the court’s construction of the statute. Therefore, I would vacate this judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in the light of its subsequent decisions, Watkins v. United States, 119 U. S. App. D. C. 409, 343 F. 2d 278 , and Black v. United States, 122 U. S. App. D. C. 393, 355 F. 2d 104 .