Opinion

Claybrooks, Sondra L. v. Insight Global, LLC

  • 2023 TN WC App. 43
Court
Tennessee Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
Filed
Sep 14, 2023
Status
Published
On the bench
Pele I. Godkin, Meredith B Weaver, Timothy W. Conner
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.5%

The opinion

FILED

Sep 14, 2023

03:22 PM(CT)

TENNESSEE

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

APPEALS BOARD

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Sondra L. Claybrooks ) Docket No. 2020-06-0489

)

v. ) State File No. 23248-2020

)

Insight Global, LLC, et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims )

Robert V. Durham, Judge )

Affirmed and Remanded

In the third interlocutory appeal in this case, the employee contends the trial court issued

a scheduling order without her input. The employee alleged multiple injuries due to a fall

in the employer’s bathroom. Previously, the employee appealed the entry of a scheduling

order, and we affirmed the court’s order. On remand, the trial court issued a new

scheduling order that, among other things, set an expedited hearing and a hearing on a

motion for summary judgment that had been filed by the Subsequent Injury and

Vocational Recovery Fund to be heard on the same day. The employee failed to attend

the hearing, although she was reportedly present in the building. She requested a

continuance in writing, which the court denied. The court then granted the motion for

summary judgment as well as the employer’s oral motion to dismiss the request for

expedited hearing, but it denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the case in its entirety.

In the second appeal, we again affirmed the court’s order. On remand, the court held a

scheduling conference and issued another scheduling order, which the employee has now

appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision, find the employee’s appeal to be

frivolous, award attorneys’ fees for the frivolous appeal, and remand the case.

Judge Pele I. Godkin delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding

Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.

Sondra L. Claybrooks, Antioch, Tennessee, employee-appellant, pro se

L. Blair Cannon, Atlanta, Georgia, for the employer-appellee, Insight Global, LLC

Patrick A. Ruth, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tennessee Subsequent Injury and

Vocational Recovery Fund

1

Factual and Procedural History

This is the third interlocutory appeal in this case. In the first appeal, we set out the

following relevant facts and procedural history as follows:

Sondra Claybrooks (“Employee”) asserts she suffered various injuries as

the result of a work-related fall on May 9, 2019, while working for Insight

Global, LLC (“Employer”). Since that time, she has received treatment

from various medical providers for symptoms related to her right hand,

right wrist, right elbow, hip, and low back. On March 3, 2021, the trial

court issued an expedited hearing order denying Employee’s claim for

temporary disability benefits and payment of certain past medical expenses.

That order was not appealed.

Following the issuance of the court’s expedited hearing order in

March 2021, several disputes arose regarding the provision of a panel of

physicians, Employee’s requests for additional medical treatment, and

written discovery requests. The court set approximately eight status

hearings between April 2021 and December 2021. In November 2021,

Employee filed a motion for temporary disability and medical benefits,

which the court treated as a request for an expedited hearing. The court set

such a hearing for January 21, 2022, but the hearing was continued at

Employee’s request on two occasions. Following the court’s granting of

Employee’s second motion for a continuance, the court set several more

status hearings. In April 2022, Employee filed two requests for expedited

hearings and a motion to compel discovery.

On August 5, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing to address

Employee’s motion to compel discovery and a request filed by Employer

for a scheduling hearing. During that hearing, Employee stated she wished

to proceed with a second expedited hearing to address her claim for

additional medical benefits. The second expedited hearing was scheduled

for September 26, 2022. The Court also set a scheduling hearing to occur

telephonically on August 25, 2022.

Claybrooks v. Insight Global, LLC, No. 2020-06-0489, 2022 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.

LEXIS 39, at *1-3 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 28, 2022) (footnotes omitted).

After the first scheduling hearing, the court entered a scheduling order setting certain

deadlines. Employee appealed the scheduling order, arguing that it was inappropriate to

enter a scheduling order prior to an expedited hearing and before she had reached

maximum medical improvement. We affirmed the court’s order, concluding that

2

Employee offered no explanation as to how the trial court erred and noting that trial

courts retain the discretion to control their dockets and the pace of litigation. Id. at *3-5.

In our decision resolving the second interlocutory appeal, we set out additional

relevant facts and procedural history, stating:

Upon remand [following the first appeal], the court issued a new scheduling

order that, among other things, set an expedited hearing for March 6, 2023.

In the meantime, the Subsequent Injury and Vocational Recovery Fund

(“SIF”) filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Employee had not

provided sufficient evidence to establish that she is permanently and totally

disabled, a material fact necessary to trigger any obligations on the part of

SIF. The motion was set to be heard on the same date as the expedited

hearing.

Employee filed a response to the motion, to which she attached

hundreds of pages of medical records, and further stated in her response

that SIF should not be dismissed as it “did not object when asked in a

hearing in 2022.” Employee further averred she was “denied a records

review [at a hearing in August 2022] . . . therefore I am unable to proceed.”

The hearing on March 6, 2023 began timely, but Employee was not

present in the courtroom. The court’s order recites the events of that day,

stating that after approximately ten minutes, the bailiff notified the court

and the parties that Employee was present in the building. The court

paused the proceedings to give Employee time to come into the courtroom.

After another twelve minutes had passed, the court asked the bailiff to bring

Employee into the courtroom. The bailiff returned with a note from

Employee indicating she was ill and wanted a continuance. The bailiff then

indicated Employee had left the premises.

The court orally denied the motion for a continuance given the late

nature of the request, as well as the numerous delays that had previously

occurred in the case. It proceeded to hear SIF’s motion for summary

judgment. Employer made an oral motion to dismiss either the entire claim

or, at a minimum, the request for an expedited hearing, given Employee’s

failure to prosecute. The court issued an order granting SIF’s summary

judgment motion, stating that Employee “did not submit any admissible

evidence establishing a material question of fact as to whether she was

permanently and totally disabled from her . . . work-related fall.” In a

separate order, the court denied Employee’s request for continuance,

granted Employer’s motion to dismiss the request for expedited hearing,

and denied Employer’s motion to dismiss the claim in its entirety.

3

Claybrooks v. Insight Global, LLC, No. 2020-06-0489, 2023 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.

LEXIS 24, at *4-6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. May 30, 2023). Employee appealed

the trial court’s decision, and we again affirmed the court’s order, finding the trial court

did not err in concluding Employee had not come forward with genuine issues of material

fact to support potential liability on the part of SIF. Id. at *11-12. We also held that the

court did not err in declining to grant Employee’s request for a continuance or in

dismissing her request for an expedited hearing in light of her refusal to come into the

courtroom despite being present in the building. Id. at *12-13. 1

On July 6, 2023, the trial court convened a telephonic scheduling hearing. At

some point during the teleconference, the call was disconnected. The court’s scheduling

order indicates the disconnection occurred after Employee’s objections to the deadline for

taking expert depositions was overruled. In her brief on appeal, Employee asserts the

trial court’s line was disconnected while she and the opposing attorney remained on the

line. Regardless, the call was discontinued, and the trial court entered a scheduling order

on July 7 setting deadlines for discovery, motions, and other pre-trial disclosures, as well

as a deadline for alternative dispute resolution. The order also scheduled trial for

November 6, 2023. Employee has appealed the entry of the court’s most recent

scheduling order.

Standard of Review

The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the

court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2022). As we have noted previously, a trial court

is afforded broad discretion to control the progress of cases on its docket and also “has

the necessary discretion to control the pace of litigation through the use of case

supervision and docket management.” Valladares v. Transco Products, Inc., Nos. 2015-

01-0117, 2015-02-0118, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 31 (Tenn. Workers’

Comp. App. Bd. July 27, 2016). We review such determinations under an abuse-of-

discretion standard which “contemplates that before reversal the record must show that a

judge ‘applied an incorrect legal standard, or reached a decision which is against logic or

reasoning that caused an injustice to the party complaining.’” Hubbard v. Sherman-Dixie

1

Thereafter, Employee filed another notice of appeal on June 7, 2023, in which she indicated she was

appealing a “motion order” entered on March 30, 2023, and an “other order” entered on March 30, 2023.

We filed an order on June 9 dismissing the appeal, noting that there were no such orders and that, even if

there were, any appeal of those orders would be untimely. We also observed that if Employee intended to

appeal our opinion issued on May 30, 2023, such an appeal was not permitted by statute. See Tenn. Code

Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(2)(A) (In interlocutory appeals, “[t]he decision of the workers’ compensation appeals

board is not subject to further review.”) Employee also filed a Request for Administrative Review of a

Specialist’s Order, a process that applies only to injuries occurring before July 1, 2014. That request was

administratively dismissed.

4

Concrete, Indus., No. E2010-02219-WC-R3-WC, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 965, at *11 (Tenn.

Workers’ Comp. Panel Oct. 18, 2011) (quoting State v. Farrell, 277 S.W.3d 372, 378

(Tenn. 2009)). We are also mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’

compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of

statutory construction” and in a way that does not favor either the employee or the

employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2022).

Analysis

On her notice of appeal, Employee states

[t]he statement given by the sitting judge is incorrect, the conference call

began at 2pm after some time on the call the [line] was disconnect [sic] to

Judge Durham. The other parties on the line [B]lair [C]annon and I do not

recall the other party on the line. Blair Cannon said: I believe that Judge

Durham[’s] line was disconnected. The other party stated that it was on his

end. The Judge did not comment because he was not on the line.

In her brief on appeal, Employee voices the same disagreement with the trial court’s

representation of the sequence of events concerning the end of the most recent

teleconference and indicated her intention to call Employer’s counsel and the attorney for

SIF as witnesses in court. Employee raises other issues concerning discovery, documents

she alleges are missing from the Bureau’s electronic filing system, her purported lack of

access to information, disputes about medical care, and the granting of SIF’s motion for

summary judgment. 2 We have already addressed several of these issues in prior

opinions.

Although Employee has filed a brief, her arguments lack any legal basis and

instead reflect a general dissatisfaction with the litigation process. In the current appeal,

as in her previous appeals, Employee has failed to assert or explain how the trial court

has allegedly erred. Moreover, Employee has offered no cogent legal argument

supporting any alleged factual or legal errors. In short, Employee has identified no

appealable issue. As such, we are unable to discern any factual or legal issues for review.

2

Employee continues to express dissatisfaction with the dismissal of SIF from the litigation, and she

references certain statements and representations allegedly made by SIF’s prior counsel. She has also

expressed her dissatisfaction that SIF has not provided medical care. Employee misunderstands the role

of Tennessee’s Subsequent Injury and Vocational Recovery Fund. SIF cannot be held responsible for the

provision of medical benefits under Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Law, and it is responsible for

disability benefits only when an injured employee is deemed permanently and totally disabled and has a

prior disability. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a)(1). As we noted in our opinion addressing

Employee’s second appeal, Employee has presented no evidence that she is permanently and totally

disabled as a result of her work injuries or that she experienced a previous disability of which Employer

was aware. The trial court’s dismissal of SIF does not impact Employee’s potential entitlement to

benefits from Employer if she satisfies the applicable burden of proof at trial.

5

As we have previously observed, the Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that “[i]t is not

the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or

arguments for him or her.” Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn.,

301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010). We cannot comb the record for possible errors and

raise issues and arguments for Employee, as we would then be acting as her counsel,

which the law clearly prohibits. See Webb v. Sherrell, No. E2013-02724-COA-R3-CV,

2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 645, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2015). As mandated by

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(c)(7), we must presume the trial court’s

factual findings are correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.

Finally, we conclude Employee’s appeal is frivolous. As we have noted

previously, a frivolous appeal is one that is devoid of merit or brought solely for delay.

Yarbrough v. Protective Servs. Co., Inc., No. 2015-08-0574, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App.

Bd. LEXIS 3, at *11 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 25, 2016); see also Burnette

v. WestRock, No. 2016-01-0670, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 66, at *15

(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 31, 2017) (“Stated another way, a frivolous appeal

is one that . . . had no reasonable chance of succeeding.” (internal citation and quotation

marks omitted)). Litigants “should not be required to endure the hassle and expense of

baseless litigation. Nor should appellate courts be required to waste time and resources

on appeals that have no realistic chance of success.” Yarbrough, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp.

App. Bd. LEXIS 3, at *10-11 (internal citations omitted).

The appellate process is not the appropriate mechanism to express vague

dissatisfaction with the trial court process. Instead, an appellant must assert and explain

how the trial court erred in making specific determinations or issuing specific orders.

Employee has failed to satisfy this burden. In each appeal she has filed, she has failed to

provide any legal argument in support of her position, and she has failed to identify with

any specificity how she believes the trial court erred. Accordingly, we find Employee’s

current appeal to be frivolous and, pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs. 0800-02-22-

.09(4), we award Employer’s counsel attorneys’ fees to be paid by Employee in the

amount of $100.00.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court, award

attorneys’ fees for a frivolous appeal, and remand the case. Costs on appeal have been

waived.

6

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Sondra L. Claybrooks ) Docket No. 2020-06-0489

)

v. ) State File No. 23248-2020

)

Insight Global, LLC, et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims )

Robert V. Durham, Judge )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced

case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 14th day

of September, 2023.

Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:

Mail Mail Fax Email

Sondra L. Claybrooks X slclay2228@gmail.com

aclaybrooks1@gmail.com

L. Blair Cannon X blair.cannon@thehartford.com

Patrick A. Ruth X patrick.ruth@tn.gov

Robert V. Durham, Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov

Workers’ Compensation Claims

Matthew Keene

Acting Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-532-1564

Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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