holding that Wolf’s personal restraint petition (PRP) was time barred because a special sex offender sentencing alternative revocation did not affect the statutory time bar against a PRP, which time started running seven years earlier when the initial sentencing was completed
How later courts described this case
- holding that Wolf’s personal restraint petition (PRP) was time barred because a special sex offender sentencing alternative revocation did not affect the statutory time bar against a PRP, which time started running seven years earlier when the initial sentencing was completed
- holding that Wolf’s personal restraint petition (PRP
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Bjorgen, C. J.
¶45 (dissenting in part) — My dissent in In re Personal Restraint of Dove concluded that under RCW 10.73.100(6), the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 835-37 , 344 P.3d 680 (2015), constituted a “ ‘significant change in the law’ ” that is “ ‘material to the . . . sentence’ ” and that “ ‘sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive application’ ” of the changed law. 196 Wn. App. 148, 166 , 381 P.3d 1280 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting RCW 10.73.100(6)). For that reason, the Dove dissent would have held that Dove’s challenge to his legal financial obligations (LFOs) was not subject to the one-year time bar for personal restraint petitions (PRPs).
¶46 The same reasoning applies with equal force to Wolf’s PRP. I would hold that his LFO challenge similarly falls within the exception to the PRP time bar of RCW 10.73.100(6) and is properly before us. Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s holding that Wolf’s LFO challenge is barred.
Reconsideration denied November 30, 2016.