finding “nothing in the opinion that would lead one to conclude that the lower court did not give . . . appellant’s assignment[] of error careful consideration”
How later courts described this case
- finding “nothing in the opinion that would lead one to conclude that the lower court did not give . . . appellant’s assignment[] of error careful consideration”
- explaining that both factual and legal sufficiency in contested courts-martial cases are measured against the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
- stating matters not introduced at trial are outside the record and may not be considered for factual or legal sufficiency on appeal
- upholding a service court's decision refusing to consider information from an Article 32, UCMJ, in evaluating guilt
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by United States v. Dawson, 65 M.J. 848 (2007)
To this extent we disagree with the Coast Guard court’s decision in Reed.
The opinion
COX, Senior Judge
(dissenting):
As the majority notes, there is strong circumstantial evidence to support a belief that appellant received a modem, took it, then set up an elaborate scheme to cover up his theft. However, in order to convict a servicemember of an offense, it is axiomatic that the Government must prove each and every element of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
The elements of larceny are set out in Article 121, UCMJ, 10 USC § 921 . Foremost among them is that the Government must prove that the accused took property “from the possession of the owner.” There is no proof in the record, direct or circumstantial, that the Government was ever in possession of “the modem” allegedly stolen by appellant. Accordingly, no matter how suspicious the circumstances, the Government’s proof of a larceny fails.