reasoning that even though the record did not indicate that the murder victim was expected to testify against the defendant in a pending criminal proceeding, the defendant’s purpose in killing her could be inferred from evidence indicating that he was trying to isolate the victim and prevent her from talking to authorities
How later courts described this case
- reasoning that even though the record did not indicate that the murder victim was expected to testify against the defendant in a pending criminal proceeding, the defendant’s purpose in killing her could be inferred from evidence indicating that he was trying to isolate the victim and prevent her from talking to authorities
- stating that “unless another hearsay exception applies, a party may not interrogate his own witness about a prior inconsistent statement ‘“for the purpose of offering substantive evidence against the accused”’”
- stating that an “error could only be construed as harmless where there is ‘no reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction[.]’”
- deferring to counsel’s judgments about whether to voir dire the jury in the middle of trial following a courtroom “outburst” that “happened very quickly” because “[u]nder the circumstances, counsel could reasonably decide not to question the jury”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Pfeifer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
*325 {¶ 353} I concur in the judgment of the majority affirming the determination of McKelton’s guilt. I join Justice O’Neill’s dissent regarding the inadequacy of trial counsel in the sentencing phase, except to the extent that it relies on his dissent in State v. Wogenstahl, 134 Ohio St.3d 1437 , 2013-Ohio-164 , 981 N.E.2d 900 .