stating that “[i]n order for an appellant to prevail on a challenge to the ____________________________________________ 8We observe that Sulit did not provide proper citation to the record to identify, with specificity, when the victim made the allegedly inconsistent statements. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (requiring reference to the place in the record where evidence may be located). -8- J-S16043-20 weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.” (citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[i]n order for an appellant to prevail on a challenge to the ____________________________________________ 8We observe that Sulit did not provide proper citation to the record to identify, with specificity, when the victim made the allegedly inconsistent statements. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (requiring reference to the place in the record where evidence may be located). -8- J-S16043-20 weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.” (citation omitted)
- explaining that “filing is the time of commencement of the action for purposes 11 of the statute of limitations, as long as the time of service complies with the service rule,” and where an extension of the time for service is granted by the trial court, service within that period “complies with the service rule”
- stating in order for an appellant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of evidence, he must establish that the evidence supporting a conviction is “so tenuous, vague, and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.” (citation omitted)
- stating in order for an appellant to prevail on a weight challenge, he must establish that the evidence supporting a conviction is “so tenuous, vague, and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.” (citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CONCURRING OPINION BY
LAZARUS, J.:
I concur because I agree with the result the majority has reached. I write separately, however, to note that my analysis would be different regarding whether the gun had an “altered” manufacturer’s number in accordance with 18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.2(a).
The majority indicates that the expert’s opinion that the number had not been “altered” should be discounted because the value of his testimony was limited to reporting the means of discerning the number and did not include defining the terms used in the statute to describe an “altered” number. The terms include that the firearm’s number has been “altered, changed, removed or obliterated.” Id. The firearms expert testified that the number had not been altered. Indeed, because the number could still be discerned via magnification, in a strict sense, the number was not altered, changed, or removed.
I note, however, that one definition of “obliterate” is “to make undecipherable or imperceptible by obscuring or wearing away.” Merriam Webster Dictionary, http://www.memam-webster.com/ dictionary/obliterate. Under this definition, “obliterated” in the statute means that the number had been made indecipherable or imperceptible. This definition aptly describes what occurred in the instant matter, since the number had been ground away to such an. extent that it was not perceivable by the naked'eye. Using this definition of “obliterated” differentiates it from the term “removed,” thereby giving full effect to the words of the statute. See Commonwealth v. McCoy, 599 Pa. 599 , 962 A.2d 1160, 1168 (2009) (‘When there is an interpretation available that gives effect to all of the statute’s phrases and does not lead to an absurd result, that interpretation must prevail.”). Furthermore, as the majority implies, this type of effort to obscure a gun’s manufacturer’s number is clearly contemplated by section 6110.2(a).
It is with this analysis in mind that I concur with the majority.
Judge Dubow joins this Concurring Opinion.