holding that because of the passage of 10 years and a lack of a record on the juvenile offender’s youthful characteristics, a fair and meaningful Miller/Montgomery hearing was not possible and remanding to the district court for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of release after 30 years
How later courts described this case
- holding that because of the passage of 10 years and a lack of a record on the juvenile offender’s youthful characteristics, a fair and meaningful Miller/Montgomery hearing was not possible and remanding to the district court for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of release after 30 years
- reviving a statute that "require[s] a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of release after 30 years" for all juvenile offenders who had been sentenced to mandatory life without parole
- “Under as-applied severance, a statutory provision is severed only as applied to a certain class of person to prevent unconstitutional applications.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STRAS, Justice
(concurring).
In accordance with my dissenting opinion in State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 267 (Minn.2014), I agree with the court that Jackson is entitled to be resentenced to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of release. Based on my dissent in Ali , however, I cannot fully join the court’s opinion because I believe that every juvenile offender facing a mandatory term of life imprisonment is entitled to such a remedy and that partial severance, not revival, fully resolves the constitutional defects in Minnesota’s current first-degree murder statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 314-26 , 125 S.Ct. 738 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (discussing partial severance). Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment of the court.