finding no Sixth Amendment **143flaw in MCL 769.25 in part because it is not "a statutory scheme that makes the imposition of life without parole contingent on any particular finding"
How later courts described this case
- finding no Sixth Amendment **143flaw in MCL 769.25 in part because it is not "a statutory scheme that makes the imposition of life without parole contingent on any particular finding"
- holding that trial court abused its discretion when it allowed a police officer to identify one of the defendants in a surveillance recording
- "A sentencing court must operate under the understanding that life without parole is, more often than not, not just inappropriate, but a violation of the juvenile's constitutional rights."
- “[T]he imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile requires a heightened degree of scrutiny regarding whether a life-without-parole sentence is proportionate to a particular juvenile offender, and even under this deferential standard, an appellate court should view such a sentence as inherently suspect.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
METER, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in Parts I, II, and III of the majority opinion. I would not, however, vacate defendant Kenya Hyatt’s sentence and remand this case for resentenc-ing.
The Milbourn 1 concept of proportionality provides an adequate framework for review of sentences such as the one imposed in the present case. The sentencing court explicitly mentioned and adhered to the principle of proportionality. In addition, the sentencing court, as noted by the panel in People v Perkins, 314 Mich App 140, 179 ; 885 NW2d 900 (2016), explicitly took the Miller factors into consideration.
*448 The majority opinion focuses on the following statement by a psychologist regarding defendant Hyatt’s capacity for change: "[I]f I were to predict in five years, it would not be possible.” 2 This statement, however, was merely one aspect of the testimony and other evidence appropriately taken into consideration by the sentencing court. In addition, while the court did not explicitly use the term “rare” as employed in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 479 ; 132 S Ct 2455, 2469 ; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US _ ; 136 S Ct 718, 733 ; 193 L Ed 2d (2016), the record makes clear that the court applied the applicable concepts from Miller in deciding that a sentence of life without parole was appropriate despite defendant Hyatt’s status as a juvenile.
Moreover, the pertinent circumstances—including that defendant Hyatt was the actual shooter, had a history of assaultive behavior, appeared to a counselor to have no conscience, showed no remorse or concern over the crimes, was “disconnected from societal morals and mores,” had “serious maladjustment,” and was 17 years old at the time of the offenses—clearly supported the sentence. See, generally, Miller, 567 US at 475-476 . The sentencing court specifically noted that defendant Hyatt’s age was not a mitigating factor in this particular case, and the court adequately set forth evidence showing that defendant Hyatt’s potential for rehabilitation was low. In Miller, id. at 478 , the Supreme Court stated that a mandatory sentence of life without parole “disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.” Here, the circumstances did not “most suggest it.”
*449 I find no violation of the principle of proportionality and no need to remand this case. The sentencing procedure was constitutional and the sentence was proportionate to the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.
I would affirm the sentence.
M. J. Kelly and Riordan, JJ., concurred with Meter, J.
People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630 ; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
The psychologist further stated that she simply could not predict whether defendant Hyatt would change.