noting that “ ‘may’ can mean the same as ‘shall’ where a statute directs the doing of a thing for the sake of justice,” but holding that the statute’s plain language indicated it was used permissively in that case
How later courts described this case
- noting that “ ‘may’ can mean the same as ‘shall’ where a statute directs the doing of a thing for the sake of justice,” but holding that the statute’s plain language indicated it was used permissively in that case
- reversing this Court’s holding that “Section 3935 of the Procurement Code requires the imposition of attorne[y] fees and the statutory penalty upon a [factfinder’s] finding of bad faith”
- "Although 'may' can mean the same as 'shall' where a statute directs the doing of a thing for the sake of justice, it ordinarily is employed in the permissive sense."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice WECHT,
concurring.
I join the learned Majority’s opinion in full, writing only to emphasize that we granted allocatur on one issue: whether a jury finding of bad faith requires the trial court to impose a statutory penalty and award attorney fees under 62 Pa.C.S. § 3935. We denied allocatur as to all other issues, including the issue raised by the dissent. Consequently, whether the bad faith question should be submitted to the jury or, in the *270 alternative, decided by the judge, is not before the Court. The parties have not fully briefed the issue, nor has it been preserved for our review. Accordingly, I do not read the majority to endorse or disapprove of the submission of the bad faith question to the jury in this specific instance or in future cases.