The opinion
On Rehearing.
We have before us motions for rehearing by both parties. Neither party agrees with the conclusion expressed by the court in the original opinion that no authority exists for presenting a case to the court in the manner in which this case was presented. A careful reconsideration of the matter leads us to the conclusion that, conceding the stipulation of counsel as an agreement as to the facts, our problem is not aided thereby, because it cannot be construed as an agreement on certain essential facts necessary to enable us to pass intelligently on the question presented. If the stipulation be construed as an agreement on the fact that appellees owned property within, the limits of the appellant school dis1-trict, that appellant has duly assessed the property for taxation, and levied a tax there-' on for a purpose for which school districts are authorized under the law to levy taxes, and that no facts exist which would eonsti-’ *716 tute a defense to appellant’s cause of action, provided the special act under attack is constitutional, still'it is insufficient to form the basis of a judgment.
Only one question is before us, and that is the construction of a certain act of the Legislature. The admitted facts above .enumerated throw no light upon that question. One of the main contentions of the appellees is that the caption of the act is misleading and deceptive. The caption is as follows:
“An Act to redefine the boundaries of Strawn Independent School District, to validate the incorporation thereof, and, declaring an emergency.” Sp. Acts 33d Leg. c. 122.
That caption may or may not be misleading and deceptive, according to the facts. To our minds' the caption indicates that the act was purely a curative or validating act to make certain the boundaries of the district as same had theretofore existed. It suggests to our minds that, because of a miscall, or some other error in the original incorporation, there was a question as to the validity of the Strawn independent school district, which created an emergency calling for the redefining of the boundaries. If, under such caption, a new school district was attempted to be created, including lands remote from the original district, and there was no deficiency in the boundaries of the original district as it existed, there is a substantial basis for the contention that the caption was misleading and deceptive. But if, on the other ¡hand, it was intended by the original field notes to include within the original district the lands of appellees, and through some error in the callings, or otherwise, such lands W-ere omitted therefrom, and .the act under construction was passed to make certain what was intended to be done under the original act of incorporation, the caption could not be held misleading or deceptive. There is nothing in the body of the act itself which furnishes any facts, and we know of no way to determine this question without knowing the facts as they existed at the time the act was passed.
Another ground of attack was that the act spread out over the new district an indebtedness of the old. We do not know how to pass upon this contention without knowing tile facts. There is nothing in this agreement to apprise us that there was any outstanding indebtedness of the original district to be spread out. If, in fact, there was no outstanding indebtedness of the original district, then it could not be said that the section of the act providing for the assumption thereof was an essential part of the act, and, under well-established principles, the entire act would not be declared void on account of its containing one section dealing with a matter purely collateral to its main purpose.
We are unwilling to strike down this act of the Legislature on the meager showing of facts contained in this record, and are also unwilling to reverse and render the judgment of the trial court striking same down without an affirmative showing that under the facts such judgment was incorrect.
Both motions are overruled.