The opinion
On Motion for Rehearing.
The principal contention of the appellants in the motion is that the contract made between Banner and appellants for the lease of the land, in consideration of money rent, part of which was evidenced by a note, was not only a legal contract when it was made, but had the effect of severing the crops to be grown on the land during the rental year, from the soil, and relieves them from sale under the foreclosure proceeding. It may- be admitted that some of the authorities cited by appellants from other jurisdictions so hold, but that is not the general rule, and the courts of Texas have held to the contrary.
In the case of Jones v. Hutchinson, 21 Tex. 370 , the Supreme Court held that the lease contract of a defaulting vendee could not protect the tenant with notice of the default, and said:
“As a general rule a person cann-ot create a larger estate in lands than he has in himself.”
As stated in the original opinion, the appellants knew that their lessor might default in the payment of the purchase money and that his vendor had the right to exercise *776 Ms option and foreclose Ms lien. They did not by their pleadings seek to recover against the defaulting vendee, and are bound by their knowledge of the condition of their lessor’s title. This is the holding of the authorities cited in the original opinion, as well as in the Jones Case, and the rule is further recognized in P. Groos & Co. v. Chittim (Tex. Civ. App.) 100 S. W. 1006 , 1010. See L. R. A. 1915C, page 204, note 2 (a).
Believing that the case has been properly disposed of by the original opinion, the motion for rehearing is overruled.