Opinion

Perry v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission

  • 180 Or. 495
  • 177 P.2d 406
  • 1947 Ore. LEXIS 143
Court
Oregon Supreme Court
Filed
Jan 21, 1947
Status
Published
On the bench
Belt, Kelly
Cited by
50 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.2%

Criticized by Yancy v. Shatzer, 337 Or. 345 (2004)

liquor commission order expired after 60 days

How later courts described this case

  • liquor commission order expired after 60 days

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Criticized by Yancy v. Shatzer, 337 Or. 345 (2004)

    It follows, we believe, that Perry and the cases that relied on Perry were wrongly decided.
    Oregon Supreme CourtSep 16, 2004Read it

The opinion

ON THE MERITS

The “Oregon Liquor Control Act” was enacted in 1933, § 24-101, et seq., O. C. L. A., for the purpose, among other things, of controlling the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages. The regulation and control of the liquor traffic always has been, and, perhaps, always will be, a vexatious and difficult problem. The legislature in the exercise of its police power saw fit to create the “Oregon Liquor Control Commission” and has delegated to it power to adopt rules and regulations to effectuate the purpose and *500 spirit of the Act. The constitutionality of the Act was sustained in Klamath Falls v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm., 146 Or. 83 , 29 P. (2d) 564 .

The rules and regulations adopted by the Commission, pursuant to subdivision (h) of § 24-106, O. C. L. A., which are “necessary and feasible for carrying out the provisions of this act”, have the “full force and effect of law”. Regulation M of the Commission making the licensee responsible for the “act or omission of any servant, agent, employee or representative” is undoubtedly reasonable and tends toward a more efficient administration of the Act. It was unlawful for the “barkeeper” to sell whiskey. It is wholly immaterial whether the licensee knew about such sale or whether it was contrary to her instructions. State v. Schull, 66 S. D. 102, 279 N. W. 241 , 115 A. L. R. 1226, 30 Am. Jur., Intoxicating Liquors, § 146, note Ann. Cas. 1912 A 1109.

When the licensee accepted the license, she impliedly agreed to obey the provisions of the Liquor Control Act and all reasonable regulations of the Commission made pursuant thereto. Manchester Press Club v. State Liquor Commission, 89 N. H. 442, 200 A. 407 , 116 A.L.R. 1093 . It was incumbent upon the licensee to conduct this night club in a lawful manner, whether it was operated bji her personally or through her agents or employees. If.the rule were otherwise, the Commission would have slight control over the sale and consumption of intoxicating liquor.

A license to serve alcoholic liquor is not a contract creating property rights. There are no vested rights involved. The license merely grants to the licensee a temporary privilege to do that which'would otherwise be unlawful. McCanless v. Klein, supra.

*501 Wide discretion is vested in the Commission to determine whether a license should be revoked or suspended. Courts should not interfere with the exercise of discretion by such administrative agencies, unless it plainly appears that there has been an abuse thereof. The Commission in the instant case did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in suspending a license for an admitted violation of the law.

The decree is reversed and the order of suspension is sustained. The Oregon Liquor Control Commission is entitled to costs and disbursements.

Kelly, J., did not participate in this decision.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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