stating that conduct is legitimate when there is a reason for it other than harassment
How later courts described this case
- stating that conduct is legitimate when there is a reason for it other than harassment
- “[C]ourts have generally held that contact is legitimate when there is a reason for the contact other than to harass the victim.”
- relying on another case’s discussion of the term in relation to cyberstalking to define it as it pertains to the anti-harassment statute
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CONNER, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that the evidence was insufficient to prove the grounds for an injunction. There are additional facts not mentioned in the majority opinion, which the majority does not feel are pertinent to the issue of whether the appellant’s conduct was sufficient to constitute stalking behavior justifying an injunction as provided by the statutes. I contend those facts are material, and the evidence proves, if not directly, then at least circumstantially, that the appellant’s behavior justifies an injunction. However, I do agree with the majority that some of the injunction prohibitions are overly broad and violate the appellant’s First Amendment right. Thus, I would affirm the entry of an injunction, but reverse and remand for the trial court to impose an injunction that does not unduly infringe on the appellant’s First Amendment rights.