explaining “that authentication for the purpose of admission is a relatively low threshold that only requires a prima facie showing that the proffered evidence is authentic; the ultimate determination of the authenticity of the evidence is a question for the fact-finder” (citing Gosciminski v. State, 132 So. 3d 678, 700 (Fla. 2013))
How later courts described this case
- explaining “that authentication for the purpose of admission is a relatively low threshold that only requires a prima facie showing that the proffered evidence is authentic; the ultimate determination of the authenticity of the evidence is a question for the fact-finder” (citing Gosciminski v. State, 132 So. 3d 678, 700 (Fla. 2013))
- determining that defendant who validly waived penalty phase jury was not entitled to relief under Hurst because a defendant “cannot subvert the right to jury factfinding by waiving that right and then suggesting that a subsequent development in the law has fundamentally undermined his sentence”
- concluding that defendant who waived penalty-phase jury was not entitled to relief under Hurst because a defendant “cannot subvert the right to jury factfinding by waiving that right and then suggesting that a subsequent development in the law has fundamentally undermined his sentence”
- explaining that a defendant “cannot subvert the right to jury factfinding by waiving that right and then suggesting that a subsequent development in the law has fundamentally undermined his sentence”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CANADY, J.,
concurring in result.
I agree with the decision to affirm the convictions and sentences. But I disagree with the conclusion that the “trial court incorrectly applied the law regarding the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance with respect to the murder of Uddin.” Majority op. at 29. Contrary to the unela-borated assertion in Garron v. State, 528 So.2d 353, 360 (Fla.1988), when a victim is slain while attempting to make a phone call during the course of a robbery, a strong inference arises that the defendant first concluded that the phone call was likely being made to summon the police and then acted against the victim to thwart phone contact with the police and thereby to avoid arrest for the robbery. The imputation of another motive to the defendant in such circumstances can only be produced by a flight of fancy. I also disagree with remanding for a written order on competency, which is an unnecessary and useless act.
POLSTON, J., concurs.