explaining that “[w]hile there are statements in PHH that may have inadvertently resulted in confusion for the district courts of appeal,” grafting a good faith or honest mistake exception into the “unlawfully refused” term when a unit of government unquestionably meets the agency definition and refuses to disclose the record would cause the statute to be “seriously diluted”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[w]hile there are statements in PHH that may have inadvertently resulted in confusion for the district courts of appeal,” grafting a good faith or honest mistake exception into the “unlawfully refused” term when a unit of government unquestionably meets the agency definition and refuses to disclose the record would cause the statute to be “seriously diluted”
- holding that once the court determines that the defendant “unlawfully refused” to permit a public record to be inspected or copied, the court must assess reasonable attorneys’ fees, whether or not the defendant acted in good faith (citing Fla. Stat. § 119.12)
- "When a statute is amended to change a key term or to delete a provision, 'it is presumed that the Legislature intended it to have a meaning different from that accorded to it before the amendment.' " (quoting Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla.1977))
- “[W]e hold that a prevailing party is entitled to statutory attorney’s fees under the Public Records Act when the trial court finds that the public agency violated a provision of the Public Records Act in failing to permit a public record to be inspected or copied.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CANADY, J.,
dissenting.
Because I would conclude that a public records custodian has not “unlawfully refused” to comply with the Public Records Act where the custodian has acted in accordance with the statutory duty of- good faith, I dissent. ■ I would quash the decision on review, disapprove Gonzalez, and approve the conflicting decisions in Alt-house, Greater Orlando, and Knight Rid-der.
Contrary to the reasoning of the majority, section 119.12, the provision of the Public Records Act imposing liability for attorney’s fees on custodians of public records, cannot reasonably be read in isolation from section 119.07(l)(c), the statutory provision that establishes the duty of custodians of public records to respond “in good faith” to requests‘to inspect or copy records. The majority’s reading of the statute uncouples the attorney’s fee remedy for a breach of > duty by a custodian of public records from the statutory definition of that duty.
The Legislature could, of course, uncouple the remedy from the duty and impose strict liability for attorney’s fees. But the language of section 119.12 neither suggests such an uncoupling nor supports the imposition of strict liability. The majority reads the phrase “unlawfully refused” in section 119.12 as equivalent to “unlawfully failed.” Majority op. at' 126. The meaning of “refused” and “failed,” however, are riot identical. Not every failure to comply constitutes á refusal to comply. Refuse means “to show or express a positive unwillingness to do or comply with.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary at 1910 (1993). A refusal to comply thus carries with it “a positive unwillingness” to comply that is not present with every failure to comply. Which brings us back to the duty on which the attorney’s fee provision is predicated: the duty to respond to public records requests “in.good faith.” Where the custodian of public records has acted in good faith, the custodian has not manifested “a positive unwillingness” to comply with the Public Records Act. In such circumstances,, an unlawful refusal to comply with the law has not occurred and *131 the attorney’s fee provision is not applicable.
POLSTON, J., concurs.