holding that sovereign immunity “bars suits complaining of an exercise of absolute discretion but not suits complaining of . . . an officer’s exercise of judgment or limited discretion without reference to or in conflict with the constraints of the law authorizing the official to act”
How later courts described this case
- holding that sovereign immunity “bars suits complaining of an exercise of absolute discretion but not suits complaining of . . . an officer’s exercise of judgment or limited discretion without reference to or in conflict with the constraints of the law authorizing the official to act”
- stating plaintiff need only allege government official 12 acted outside his discretion by using unreliable or dissimilar method in property classification to demonstrate court’s jurisdiction; court need not conclusively decide method was dissimilar or unreliable on plea to jurisdiction
- noting that governmental immunity does not bar claims alleging that governmental officer acted ultra vires, or without legal authority, in carrying out duties
- stating that “governmental immunity only extends to those government officers who are acting consistently with the law, which includes those who act within their granted discretion”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Lehrmann,
concurring.
I agree that the railroads have alleged viable ultra vires claims that are not barred by governmental immunity, and I join the Court’s judgment and opinion in full. I write separately to elaborate on the Court’s characterization of a governmental *170 entity’s immunity from suit, an issue with which we have recently grappled.
Quoting our opinion in Rusk State Hospital v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 91 (Tex. 2012), the Court notes that “immunity from suit implicatés courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction.” 892 S.W.3d at 91. Notably, when we made that statement in Rusk, we stopped short of saying that' “immunity equates to ‘a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for all purposes.” Rusk State Hasp., 392 S.W.3d at 95 ; see also id. at 102 (Hecht, J., concurring) (noting that “the Court does not equate immunity to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction”). Our use of the word “implicates” was no accident.
That immunity from suit implicates aspects of subject-matter jurisdiction has led us to hold that certain rules associated with the subject-matter jurisdiction label apply to such immunity, including that it may be raised for the first time on interlocutory appeal. Id. at 94 ; see also Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.1999) (holding that immunity from suit is properly raised in a plea to the jurisdiction). We have not yet had occasion to address whether certain other aspects of subject-matter jurisdiction apply to immunity from suit. See, e.g., Rusk State Hosp., 392 S.W.3d at 102 (Hecht, J., concurring) (“[W]hile a court is obliged to examine its subject-matter jurisdiction on its own in every case, we have never suggested that a court should raise immunity on its own whenever the government is sued.”). Most notably, we have not examined whether a governmental entity’s immunity from suit renderka final judgment against the entity void and thus “forever ... open to reconsideration.” In re United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Tex.2010) (“A judgment is void if rendered by a court without subject matter jurisdiction.”).
This case does not present these questions, making it unnecessary to further examine here the nature of the government’s immunity from suit. I mention these issues only to clarify that they remain unresolved and suitable for further analysis in the proper case.