noting that “[i]ncident to service” is not “a narrow term” and that courts have found service members to be engaged in an activity “incident to service” “when . . . enjoying a drink in a noncommissioned officers club, . . . riding a donkey during a ballgame sponsored by the Special Services division of a naval air station, and while swimming in a swimming pool at an airbase” (quoting Hass for Use & Benefit of U.S. v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1141 (4th Cir. 1975))
How later courts described this case
- noting that “[i]ncident to service” is not “a narrow term” and that courts have found service members to be engaged in an activity “incident to service” “when . . . enjoying a drink in a noncommissioned officers club, . . . riding a donkey during a ballgame sponsored by the Special Services division of a naval air station, and while swimming in a swimming pool at an airbase” (quoting Hass for Use & Benefit of U.S. v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1141 (4th Cir. 1975))
- discussing the breadth of the Feres doctrine and noting that "a plaintiff need not be on duty" for it to apply
- “[T]he situs of the injury is not as important as ‘whether the suit requires the civilian court to second-guess military decisions . . . and whether the suit might impair essential military discipline.’”
- not mentioning the rationales at all
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SHEDD, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the majority that the Feres “incident to service” test warrants our abstention from reviewing Aikens’ § 1983 claim. Although that determination is dis-positive of this appeal, I write briefly to express my view that even if Feres were inapplicable, the summary judgment is af-firmable based on Aikens’ failure to present sufficient evidence to withstand the summary judgment motion.
Aikens’ § 1983 claim is based on his contention that Ingram and von Jess violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and Aikens “grounds his Fourth Amendment claims in [their] personal involvement in the searches and seizures of his emails.” Reply Brief, at 12. In moving for summary judgment, Ingram and von Jess presented evidence showing that they were not personally involved in the email monitoring. Despite having had ample opportunity, Aikens has failed to present any evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact tending to show otherwise. Instead, as the district court found, the record establishes that Ingram and von Jess “were not involved, directly or indirectly, in the [email] monitoring,” and “[n]o evidence has been presented that demonstrates either defendant knew how the emails were obtained.... ” Aikens v. Ingram, 71 F.Supp.3d 562, 571-72 (E.D.N.C. 2014).
Aikens’ entire case is premised on con-clusory allegations and speculation. Of course, such “evidence” is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Hum-phreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir.2015). Accordingly, Aikens’ § 1983 claim fails as a matter of law. For this reason, in addition to the Feres “incident to service” test, I believe the summary judgment should be affirmed.