Opinion

People v. Ross

  • 395 Ill. App. 3d 660
  • 335 Ill. Dec. 47
  • 917 N.E.2d 1111
  • 2009 Ill. App. LEXIS 1056
Court
Appellate Court of Illinois
Filed
Oct 28, 2009
Status
Published
Author
Coleman
On the bench
Murphy, Coleman
Cited by
37 cases

recognizing that the mere existence of some factual disparities between the other crime and the charged offense does not defeat the admissibility of other crimes evidence because no two independent crimes are ever completely identical in every respect

How later courts described this case

  • recognizing that the mere existence of some factual disparities between the other crime and the charged offense does not defeat the admissibility of other crimes evidence because no two independent crimes are ever completely identical in every respect
  • holding that the amendment to an indictment, which changed the type of sexual contact from penis-to-anus contact to penis-to-vagina contact in a criminal sexual assault case, was formal
  • holding amendments to an indictment that change the manner in which the defendant committed the offense are formal, not substantive
  • finding a 17-year time elapse between crimes, which was mitigated by the defendant’s 5 years of incarceration, was insufficient to support a finding of an abuse of discretion

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

JUSTICE COLEMAN, specially concurring:

I concur with the majority’s opinion affirming the conviction and finding that the amendments to the indictment were permissible under the law. I write separately to emphasize a point noted by the majority, as well as by the trial court, that the State’s actions with respect to amending the indictment were “sloppy” and “embarrassing.”

Although I agree with that assessment of the State’s conduct in this case, I would go further. Here, the indictment did not simply contain a single error that was inadvertently overlooked; instead, it appears that the State merely changed the date of the crime and used the same charges that were filed in another case. Presumably, the State did not review the charging instrument to ensure that it accurately reflected the particular case for which it sought the indictment. Not only did the name of the victim refer to another case pending against this defendant, but the particular criminal sexual conduct alleged was also incorrect. Although the law allows for amendments to the indictment such as was done here, it is unacceptable to so casually “cut-and-paste” charges in an indictment. This particular instance of carelessness deserves further comment because the inaccuracies went undiscovered until the victim testified at trial.

Clearly there was substantial evidence against this defendant involving multiple acts of criminal sexual conduct against multiple victims, which the State vigorously and successfully prosecuted. I recognize that keeping the details of each case distinct may be challenging, particularly in cases like this one where there are several cases involving multiple counts with multiple victims that appear similar and are filed against the same defendant. However, it is in such cases that the need for precision and accuracy in each charging instrument becomes all the more important in order to avoid imparting any confusion to the grand jury, the trier-of-fact, and the defendant.

Thus, it is not merely “sloppy” and “embarrassing” to have both the name of the victim and the conduct alleged stated incorrectly on the indictment, but it suggests a kind of cavalier attitude that is unbecoming of representatives of the People of the State of Illinois.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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